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Worldwide Report

ARMS CONTROL

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR'S BOVIN ON SDI REALIZATION, EUROPE'S EUREKA

AU2206-1 Moscow MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN in Russian No 11, Nov 85 (Signed to Press 18 Oct 85) pp 97-106

[Article by A. Bovin, political observer of the newspaper IZVESTIYA: "Western Europe--'Concerns of a Strategic Nature'"]

[Text] In announcing his "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI), the realization of which would involve a radical restructuring of NATO military doctrine, the incumbent U.S. President "forgot" to consult his allies. To tell the truth, the allies have almost become accustomed to that through all the years of existence of the North Atlantic bloc. The "big brother" has not spoiled them too many times with tactful treatment. And yet....

The Western European extreme right wing, ultraconservative political circles have enthusiastically supported the President's "initiative." As they have become acquainted with the "star wars" programs and as they have recognized its possible and inevitable consequences, the left-wing circles and the mass antiwar movements have continued to express their resolute protest. As far as official Europe, the "Europe of governments" is concerned, its reaction has been cautious and restrained. It has been characterized, especially at the beginning, by confusion, hesitation, and contradiction. As it often happens, the allied loyalty and the feeling of class solidarity came into conflict with the economic and political interests of Western Europe and with its understanding of the requirements and future prospects of its own security.

I note, by the way, that any formulation of the question of security presupposes the existence of danger. As far as Western European ruling circles are concerned, this danger is represented by the "Soviet threat." The mythical threat is used as the basis for completely real political actions. Henceforth, we will bear this in mind without stipulating every time the absence of the "Soviet threat."

The U.S. Administration was irritated but made it appear as though everything was in order and as though what was involved was only a small "family" disagreement. However, the American Congress where the opposition Democratic Party is strongly represented, decided to verify the

situation on the spot. At the request of Democratic Senator W. Proxmire, officials of the Capitol apparatus were dispatched to Western Europe. The "Congress sleuths," as they were called on this side of the Atlantic Ocean, visited Bonn, Brussels, London, and Paris. "The results were catastrophic," West German journal DER SPIEGEL summed up. "As these 'scouts' reported, a majority of government representatives in the capitals of the four European NATO allies declined the 'Strategic Defense Initiative.' To tell the truth, the allies are essentially not declaring themselves against the scientific research work in the sphere of 'star wars.' However, the actual placing [deystvitelnaya ustanovka] of an antimissile barrier is opposed everywhere: The newness of American armament has provoked a new serious disorder in the Western alliance." (Footnote 1) (DER SPIEGEL, 18 February 1985)

We will try to take a closer look at the Western European reaction to the Strategic Defense Initiative and at what Lord Carrington (by the way, an active advocate and propagandizer of the Strategic Defense Initiative) has called "concerns of a strategic nature." (Footnote 2) (See LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, 15 June 1985)

Concern No. 1. The fear that the United States might once again withdraw into isolationism. If America surrounded itself with a space bastion of laser weapons and secluded itself in its invulnerable technological fortress, Western Europe would find itself without protection. Consequently, the gap in strategic positions will increase within the framework of transatlantic relations, the asymmetry of security will be intensified, and there will be regions with different degrees of protection.

Concern No. 2. Although the Americans assure their NATO partners almost an oath that the projected antimissile defense system will "cover" Western Europe without fail, their partners have very strong doubts about that, especially considering the "Europarameters," such as the short approach time, low flight trajectories of missiles, and the like. And an unprotected and uncovered Western Europe will inevitably be separated from America. It will become neutral and will gradually enter into the Soviet orbit. This is bad. But something else is also bad.

Concern No. 3. If the American ABM system reliably protected Western Europe, the latter would place itself in such a state of dependence on the American "umbrella" that it would turn into America's satellite, wavering between hostility toward its master and political and military irresponsibility.

Concern No. 4. No defense system can be perfect. But if the United States believed in the perfection of its ABM system and its "absolute reliability," then it might be gripped by a false sense of security and impunity which could push Washington into all kinds of adventures that would be contrary to the interests of Western Europe. The position of absolute invulnerability is utopia, writes E. Eppler, well-known theoretician of the Social Democratic Party of Germany. "But this Utopia is not only

false but also mortally dangerous and dangerous at that not only for the adversary but, first and foremost, for the ones who follow it." And that includes those, the Western Europeans fear, who follow the "absolutely invulnerable" leader.

Concern No. 5. If, after the United States, the USSR also created [sozdavat] its own antimissile defense--and this is virtually inevitable--the two big powers would no longer live in fear of a retaliatory nuclear strike. Then there will be a possibility that the United States and the USSR will be solving their disputes by means of conventional or even nuclear weapons but condemning to destruction not their own but foreign territory. The most probable version in this connection would be military operations in Europe which would destroy the Western European states.

Concern No. 6. This concern is primarily the concern of France and Great Britain. Their relatively small nuclear missile potential has strategic significance only if the potential adversary--that is, according to London and Paris, the Soviet Union--has no ABM system. But if the USSR develops [sozdavat] a full-scale ABM system, the nuclear forces of France and Britain will lose all of their significance and will become unnecessary and useless. And at the same time, this will put an end to the hopes for the prospects of creating an independent "European defense" and, consequently also the hopes to level the status of Western Europe with the status of the big powers and to consolidate its positions as one of the decisive factors in world politics.

There is obviously no need to go into the essence of the listed "strategic concerns" and to assess their substantiation and political orientation. What is important is the fact that they exist and that they affect the perception of the American "initiative." However, among the concerns and worries which the "star wars" program has provoked in Western Europe there is one about which I want to speak especially, and that is the fate of the Soviet-American negotiations in Geneva.

All those who look with hopes to Geneva--and they are a majority in Western Europe--fear and fear not without grounds that the Strategic Defense Initiative will block the possibilities for an accord [dogovoritsya]. And this would mean canceling out all prospects for a revival of detente. It would signify a new round of the arms race. And finally it would mean a weakening of international stability and, consequently, a deterioration of Western Europe's strategic position. "The main question that must be asked in this connection," Ch. Hernu, former French minister of defense, has reflected, "is essentially the following: is this future antimissile system desirable? The world's best specialists doubt that the deployment [razvertynaiye] of the new defense system will make it possible to ensure a more stable international situation than the situation which is now ensured by the nuclear equilibrium. Therefore I think, that in proposing such a system President Reagan is probably taking a certain risk." If the U.S. president only risked the fate of America, then let come what may. But he is risking the fate of his allies, the fate of the entire world.

This troubles and disturbs the people and gives rise to mass protest, all of which also affects the policy of the ruling circles and intensifies their doubts and wavering.

And yet, despite all these doubts and wavering and despite the "concerns of a strategic nature," the class solidarity, the social community, and the political-strategic dependence of Western Europe have accomplished their task. A majority of the Western European NATO member-countries have approved and expressed support for research work within the framework of the Strategic Defense Initiative. However, they have not done it without reservations.

The Western European conditions for supporting the strategic defense initiative were formulated for the first time by M. Thatcher, prime minister of Great Britain, during her visit to the United States in December 1984: First, the goal of the West is not to achieve superiority but to maintain an equilibrium with the USSR; second, considering the obligations that have been agreed upon, the deployment of an active defense system must be a subject of negotiations; third, the goal is to strengthen and not undermine the means of deterrence; and fourth, the goal of negotiations between the East and West is to strive to ensure security while reducing the level of offensive weapons on both sides. The U.S. president assured his guest that this is precisely how he understands the task.

The main "reservation" amounts to a demand for a strict differentiation between the research work that is approved and supported and the deployment of an ABM system that must become the subject of negotiation with the USSR. Considering it abstractly, this differentiation makes sense. But, staying in the sphere of practical politics, it is not difficult to understand that the enormous inertia of the multibillion expenditures for research and development is completely capable of canceling out the aforementioned differentiation.

H. Kohl, FRG chancellor, also outlined his "strategic demands" in the Bundestag on 18 April 1985:

Europe's security must not be separated from the security of the United States; in the sphere of NATO activity there should be no regions with different levels of security.

The NATO strategy of flexible response remains in effect as long as no other alternative of preventing war is found, that is, no other alternative that promises success in this respect. It is necessary to avoid instability at the possible stage of transition from the strategy of pure deterrence to the new form of strategic stability actively based on defense systems.

It is necessary to reduce disparity and avoid the rise of new hotbeds of threats below the nuclear threshold.

Both the condition of the British prime minister and the demands of the FRG chancellor contain quite a few elements of streamlining, uncertainty, and ambiguousness. Speaking in the most general manner, they can be used as a means of distancing oneself from Washington's fear-inspiring initiative but they also can prepare the ground for gradually moving the positions involved step by step closer to one another. In the conditions of international tension the prospects for the latter appear more probable.

The United States works to realize precisely the latter prospects. It continues to exert overt and massive pressure on the allies, demanding not only understanding and support for the strategic defense initiative but also the Western Europeans' practical participation in its realization, naturally, on American conditions.

At the regular session of the NATO nuclear planning group which was held in Luxembourg toward the end of March 1985, a letter from C. Weinberger, U.S. secretary of defense, was distributed to the ministers of foreign affairs. The letter made it clear that the Americans have no intention of engaging in any protracted arguments with the Western Europeans: The latter must make their choice more quickly. "If your nation," C. Weinberger wrote, "is interested, I ask you to inform me within 60 days about the existence of your country's interest in participating in this research program." (Footnote 3) (DER SPIEGEL, 1 April 1985) The letter of the U.S. Secretary of Defense was assessed in the Western European capitals as an "ultimatum" and "blackmail." Even the U.S. Department of State considered it "provocative and stupid." (Footnote 4) (THE WASHINGTON POST, 1 April 1985) Nevertheless, the ministers (let us note that France does not attend the sessions of the nuclear planning group) approved the research program within the framework of the Strategic Defense Initiative.

Events developed differently at the session of the NATO Council in Estoril (Portugal, in June 1985). Despite the U.S. delegation's heavy behind-the-scene activity, France blocked the inclusion of any mention whatsoever of the Strategic Defense Initiative in the final summing-up document. "The American delegation," the correspondent of the Belgian news agency BELGA commented on what had taken place, "returned to Washington having gotten nothing for its pains." It was up to the U.S. secretary of state to put a good face on a bad game.

To tell the truth, the game is not finished by far. It continues. And Washington is convinced that the transatlantic allies will make noise and make more noise and then they will do it the "way it should be done." To direct events precisely to this channel, the Americans continue to intensively exaggerate the thesis of allied solidarity and emphasize their desire and readiness to consult their NATO partners and to take account of their interests. "The United States will not make any kind of decisions whatsoever on the 'Strategic Defense Initiative,'" M. Kampelman, chief of the American delegation to the Geneva negotiations, promises, "without discussing that question with its allies. The Strategic Defense Initiative must be a factor of strengthening Atlantic alliance. If it does not strengthen it, it will not be continued." This, of course, is

clear propaganda and advertising overkill. The Americans will push on with their line irrespective of what happens on the NATO European flank. They are convinced of their forces and their influence.

Another "more easily understood" logic has been also set in motion. If you do not support us, Washington is suggesting to its allies, and if NATO fails to demonstrate unity, this will weaken the West's general position in Geneva. And vice versa, if Western Europe supports the Strategic Defense Initiative and joins in its realization, the Russians will be more obliging and we will reach an accord with the East more quickly. This logic has an effect on the Western Europeans. They want to see an accord reached in Geneva.

However, they well understand that there is yet another political logic: Washington's emphasis on the Strategic Defense Initiative (even with full and unreserved support from Western Europe) can turn into the main obstacle on the path to achieving an accord in Geneva. And this second version is much more logical than the first one, something which, as has been already said, will not suit Western Europe. In canceling out Geneva, the change of the strategy proposed by Washington will also cancel out the hopes for ending the arms race and lead to what R. Dumas, France's minister of foreign relations, calls "superarmament," and in general, to a turn of events that will be completely beyond any control or influence by Western Europe.

Recognizing that the level of popularity of their political strategic arguments is not very high, the American authorities are emphasizing the technological-economic arguments. Either you help us and work together with us, they say, or the technological gap between the United States and Western Europe will become even deeper. References to the fact that 90 percent of projects planned within the framework of the Strategic Defense Initiative will have civilian application are used in this connection as an especially effective bait.

The arguments that military research and military production will have a favorable effect on civilian branches of the economy and on the general tone of the economy have long since become a stereotypical pattern of militarist propaganda. But facts refute this thesis. Precisely the American experience has shown that the benefits derived from civilian application of the military-technological "waste products" cannot be compared to the immense losses suffered by the society as a result of the enormous expenditures for military production and military science. "It is hardly possible to doubt," E. Mansfield, well-known American economist, has written, "that the gain which the civilian branches might obtain from military programs would be more reliable and would cost less if the funds on this scale were appropriated directly for civilian purposes." This argument is theoretically indisputable. However, different arguments are in effect wherever making profits is the purpose of production. Therefore the Americans' agitation is not unsuccessful by far. Therefore there is an active pro-American lobby in Western Europe which promotes a unification of "star" efforts on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean.

The FRG's position probably shows in the most graphic way an aspiration to cooperate with the United States in the technological field. In his aforementioned and cited statement on 18 April this year the West German Chancellor said: "The technological and economic interests alone cannot determine the decision on our possible participation in the research program; however, we must take care to ensure that the FRG and Western Europe will not be left on the sidelines of technological progress and thereby turn into something like second class forces." Wherever "technological-economic interests" have their say, calculations of not making a bad bargain, of defending these very interests, and of obtaining benefits come to the fore. And H. Kohl formulates in detail the "criteria and conditions" of possible cooperation. This cooperation, first, should ensure honest partnership and a free exchange of obtained knowledge; second, it must not be a technological one-way street; third, within the limits of possibilities, it should assign to the FRG research spheres as a whole; and fourth, it should thereby make it possible to influence the common project.

The meaning of all these "criteria and conditions" is cooperation between equals. Western Europe refuses (in any event, as long as it does refuse) to play the role of a subcontractor and demands recognition of its equal status. This is especially clearly revealed in France's position.

"Paris does not believe," Zh. Anatrik [name as translated], observer of LE MONDE has written, "in the sincerity of Washington's extremely diffuse proposals of cooperation. As it is said in Paris, the main purpose of these proposals is to 'paralyze the criticism of the Strategic Defense Initiative' and undermine the initiatives of the European in this field. It is noted in this connection that the United States has always looked askance at the development of cooperation among the European countries in the sphere of advanced technology." (Footnote 5) (LE MONDE, 22 March 1985) From Paris' viewpoint, Britain and the FRG have spoken out hastily in connection with the Strategic Defense Initiative, without waiting for a discussion of the problem in Western Europe and without thinking out the possible alternatives.

France has acted more radically. In mid-April it put forward the Eureka project that is aimed at unifying and concentrating the efforts of Western European countries in the most important and most up-to-date areas of scientific-technological progress. It is understandable, French President F. Mitterrand has said, that the United States wants to ensure for itself the scientific-technological, and financial assistance of Western Europe by acting on the basis of bilateral agreements. This must be prevented; the brain drain must be prevented. Developing further his idea, the French president emphasized: "The Eureka project corresponds to a very simple idea: If Europe wants to ensure its future in the 90's and in the next period, then it is necessary already today to make a great leap in the technological sphere. And to accomplish this leap forward, Europe must unite its forces."

Paris does not tire repeating that Eureka is the Strategic Defense Initiative in reverse. The Strategic Defense Initiative is a military program

Involving important consequences for civilian spheres, whereas Eureka is a civilian program that has great importance for military production.

At the beginning Bonn and London adopted a guarded approach to Eureka. They feared that a strong opposition between the French and the American programs and the necessity of choosing between them would exacerbate transatlantic relations too much. But as the official and unofficial contacts between the three European capitals continued, it became clear that Eureka can be considered not as an alternative to the Strategic Defense Initiative but as a special kind of parallel project. This opened up the possibilities for manifesting both NATO solidarity (participation in the Strategic Defense Initiative) and European patriotism (participation in Eureka). At the session of the European Community Council (in Milan in June 1985), "little Europe" approved the French project. The giants of electronic industry such as the French Thomson Company, the Dutch Philips, the West German Siemens, and the British General Electric have also expressed themselves in support of Eureka. It has to be assumed that this does not exclude their also joining the Strategic Defense Initiative.

On 17 July 1985 an intergovernment conference on the Eureka project was held in Paris. It was attended by 17 states, that is, all EEC member-states and Australia, Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, and Finland. They were all in principle "for" the project. The communique stated: "As of this day, the Eureka project has been created [sozdavat]." However, the practical questions of the project (structure, management organs, financing, and so forth) have not yet been solved by far. More than one conference will be needed for the Eureka project to make its first independent step.

Precisely at the time when the heads of the Common Market states and governments held their discussion in Milan, U.S. Vice President G. Bush was in Western Europe where he had been dispatched to agitate for participation in the realization of the Strategic Defense Initiative. Observing tact and considering the sensitivity of the question, he used more the carrot than the stick and more arguments than threats. He even expressed support for Eureka. However, he did not succeed. On the eve of G. Bush's visit the British newspaper THE GUARDIAN wrote that the Western European governments have "no desire to send off the vice president back to Washington with a 'seal of approval' for the star wars program in his pocket." (Footnote 6) (THE GUARDIAN, 21 June 1985) And that is how it happened.

E. Teller, one of the real initiators of the President's star wars plan and well-known American physicist, traveled to Western Europe at the same time as G. Bush. Naturally he also agitated for the Strategic Defense Initiative. But it is doubtful whether the vice president thanked the physicist for his support. Using the rights of an "enfant terrible," [French term used], a person who must be forgiven everything, Teller at times spoke the truth. Indulging in confidences at the session of the symposium organized in Paris by the conservative organization of the Fund of the Future, he said that the story about the Strategic Defense Initiative being called upon to liquidate nuclear weapons on earth has been invented for domestic consumption in the United States in order to deal a

blow to the antiwar movement and force it to reconcile itself to the Strategic Defense Initiative.

Taking account of the complicated nature of the situation, the Americans "forgot" the 60-day deadline. They decided to act independently of the reaction of government circles and started to make direct contacts with Western European firms and scientific institutions. It is reported, for instance, that L. Olmer, U.S. under secretary of commerce, and W. Schneider, U.S. under secretary of state, held a meeting in the little town of Neu-Isenburg near Frankfurt-am-Main with leaders of leading West German firms to draw them "into direct collaboration" in realizing the Strategic Defense Initiative. The officials of the FRG Ministry of Foreign Affairs who were invited to the Neu-Isenburg meeting reported to their minister: "The U.S. Government pursues its goal on ensuring the research potential of foreign companies for the Strategic Defense Initiative. In this connection it pays no attention to the fact that its NATO partners have by no means yet accepted its proposal for cooperation within the framework of the Strategic Defense Initiative." (Footnote 7) (DER SPIEGEL, 16 May 1985) But representatives of firms and especially the scientists find it difficult to resist, first, the promises of economic and technological advantages and, second, the generous financing.

This is the picture that emerges: Restraint at the government level seems to be compensated for by enthusiasm at the level of corporations. The striving for earnings is clearly gaining the upper hand over national interests. Competition in the market of technological "miracles" makes them "forget" that work for the Strategic Defense Initiative is work against the security of their own country. There is really nothing strange in this. We remember the textbook statement: "What is good for General Motors...." The European analogues of this American company reason precisely this way.

Toward the end of the fall of 1985 neither NATO nor the EEC had adopted any decision on supporting the Strategic Defense Initiative and, even less, on participation in its realization. In an atmosphere of general cautiousness, the attitude toward the American initiative varies from country to country.

France is the main opposition force. The traditions of Gaullism are obviously manifesting themselves in France which means a keen national self-awareness and a greater sensitivity toward any encroachments upon the national independence. France's position is also conditioned by the aspiration to press the "European idea," to strive for Western Europe's consolidation while not forgetting in this connection the desirability of advancing France's economic and political role on the continent. In the face of the common fate of the continent, writes C. Julien, director of the monthly LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, the joint position of European allies "imposes itself despite the strong pressure exerted by Washington on each of the capitals concerned. There is a danger that, if they each act singly, in the next '20 or 30 years' each of them will have to consent--depending on the results of the research that has been initiated--to any new changes in the doctrine even if such changes might seem to them as being incompatible with their own concepts of national security."

Many French official and unofficial figures, reflecting upon "integration" topics, more and more often sound the "defense," the military note that is closely connected with an emotional nonacceptance of American guardianship. "Protection is never free," C. Julien continues. "And since it has to be paid for anyway, is it not better for Europe to finance its own defense? This way Europe would be able to devote a large part of its resources to efforts that would enable it to have its own observation satellites and, if need be, intervention satellites. Only this kind of Europe will have a chance to survive." (Footnote 8) (LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, May 1985)

And thus, to survive it is necessary to have "intervention satellites." This is put in an extraordinarily delicate way. And yet, when what is involved are serious matters, it is useful to call them by their real names. "Intervention satellites" are nothing more than space-based strike combat systems. As we can see, it is not only Washington that thinks about them.

In this connection the FRG is closer to the United States' position than any other country. Reporting on the general atmosphere that is predominant in the highest political echelons in Bonn, FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU notes: "In our country we have a large number of politicians and public writers who snatch the new armaments systems the way a dog snatches a bone, even if this 'miracle weapon' still exists only on paper. And those who do not snatch that bone are called 'red' or 'fools.'" (Footnote 9) (FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU, 5 August 1985)

At the regular meeting of "the seven" in Bonn (in May 1985) H. Kohl supported the U.S. President's "initiative" in very energetic terms. This provoked a negative reaction from F. Mitterrand. And the chancellor had to correct his position and make it more guarded and more flexible. Addressing 184 parliamentarians from NATO member-countries in Stuttgart on 20 May, H. Kohl said that the Strategic Defense Initiative "simultaneously" promises the Western alliance "both opportunities and dangers." Bonn sees its task as being that of combining the pro-American and pro-European components of its policy and at the same time obtaining for itself by bargaining the maximally advantageous technological-economic conditions of cooperation. And in this connection, as has also been the case in the past, no account is taken of West German public opinion. The fact is that, according to the results of a public opinion poll taken by one of the FRG public opinion institutes, 60 percent of the republic's citizens reject their country's participation in the Strategic Defense Initiative. Only 17 percent of them expressed themselves in favor of such participation.

It has also been said that the FRG will participate in the realization of the Strategic Defense Initiative irrespective of the positions of other Western European states. "It goes without saying that the government will participate," H. Geissler, secretary of the Christian Democratic Union, has stated. "Anything else would be idiotic. Even if no one else in Europe participates, we will participate." This articulate formulation of

the question has been commented no less articulately by DER SPIEGEL:
"Chancellor Kohl has got mixed up in a reckless adventure: Bonn will participate in the American space armaments even if it becomes necessary for it to do so alone. This way, the FRG chains itself forever to the United States and becomes the frontline state that is hostile to the USSR. The price is high: It is unlikely that Europe will be able to make use of the technology of the Strategic Defense Initiative but will therefore have to watch how the policy of detente is being destroyed." (Footnote 10) (DER SPIEGEL, 16 May 1985)

It is hard to say what reasons have influenced FRG Government circles, but they have decided to free themselves from their list toward the United States which has already come too obvious. "Bonn," J. Moelleman, minister of state in the FRG Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has stated, "must give priority to the European programs of technological development which are based on the principle of equality." Nevertheless, the FRG Government is unlikely to renounce participation in the "star wars" program for both political and economic considerations.

By joining work on the realization of the Strategic Defense Initiative, the FRG must assume a part of the responsibility for the strategic weapons system without the right to have its say in this connection on the question of its deployment [razmeshcheniye] and control. Opposition circles consider this to be an adventure. "West German participation in the American Strategic Defense Initiative," E. Bahr, chairman of the Bundestag subcommission for disarmament and arms control and director of the Hamburg Institute for the Study of International Problems, emphasizes, "signifies in practice a movement toward strategic armaments. We thereby assume a responsibility regardless of whether or not we will subsequently possess these weapons. And we will bear this responsibility, with all the consequences that may derive from this for our relations with the Eastern European countries. We may become junior deliverers and financiers without the right to vote and without any possibility of reducing the damage resulting from this." E. Bahr is right. But official Bonn thinks along different lines.

London is charting its course somewhere between Paris and Bonn. The British accept Eureka. They also accept the Strategic Defense Initiative. However, critical notes are perhaps heard more loudly among British official circles than they are in Bonn. Commenting on statements on the "star wars" program by Geoffrey Howe, Great Britain's minister of foreign affairs, the London newspaper SUNDAY TELEGRAPH writes: "Sir Geoffrey essentially rejects the president's proposal on creating [sozdaniye]...a space-based defense system as being an expensive, unrealistic, and potentially dangerous fantasy." (Footnote 11) (SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, 24 March 1985) The newspaper probably exaggerates Sir Geoffrey's negativism. Nevertheless, his statements go considerably further than the guarded reservations expressed by the prime minister although, as journalists claim, Mrs Thatcher has approved the opposition stand of her minister of foreign affairs....

The president's "initiative" has also met with objections on the part of those who think that the billions allotted for the Strategic Defense Initiative should be spent more gainfully for a real [worthy] task, that is, for the modernization of conventional weapons that are in fact becoming more and more unconventional. For instance, D. Watt, former director of the Royal Institute of International Relations, thinks so. "This entire initiative," he says angrily, "continues to give the impression of a dangerous clouding of the mind as well as of a criminal squandering of enormous resources and of diverting these resources from much more topical primary strategic tasks." Accordingly, the government is scarcely doing a good deed by encouraging such an initiative.

The British Government's position is also being attacked from another side. N. Kinnock, leader of the Labor Party, has stated that "only a fool or a liar can claim that the 'star wars' program will supposedly stop at the research stage." The realization of such plans which create only an "illusion of security," but which in fact lead to an intensification of the arms race, he noted, represents a "foolish squandering of financial resources and the achievements of advanced technology and scientific thought." "The concept of an invulnerable nuclear 'umbrella' is a fantasy," Kinnock said. He has called M. Thatcher "Mrs Echo of President Reagan" because of her statements on the British Government's support for research in the "star wars" program. It is possible that, as far as the "echo" part is concerned, N. Kinnock bends the meaning somewhat, even if he does it for understandable reasons. But the prime minister really does not want to lose her reputation as the staunchest supporter of the U.S. President. It seems that disappointment awaits her. "Great Britain has asked for a piece of cake but has been offered only crumbs," is noted in London. And it is nevertheless not excluded that in London they will even agree to crumbs.

Greece, Norway, Denmark, and the Netherlands have adopted negative positions in relations to participation in the Strategic Defense Initiative. Other European NATO members are still thinking about it.

All in all, Western Europe is arguing, wavering, saying "yes" but immediately adding "but...." Various classes and various social groups are putting forward different arguments and counterarguments and different considerations and motivate their positions on the basis of their specific interests. There is evident growing understanding of the fact that transfer of the arms race to outer space brings a sharp deterioration of the international situation and this also means a deterioration of Western Europe's strategic position. But strong pressure by the Americans is also evident.

Western Europe is at a crossroads. How many times already....

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CSO: 5200/1191

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

XINHUA ON JAPANESE OPPOSITION TO SDI

OW251915 Beijing XINHUA in English 1847 GMT 25 Nov 85

[Text] Tokyo, 25 Nov (XINHUA)--Over 1,200 Japanese physicists issued a statement yesterday, firmly opposing U.S. President Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) project.

Instead of leading to the destruction of nuclear weapons, the statement points out, the project would encourage arms race in the outer space and increase the danger of a nuclear war.

The statement calls on scientists in Japan and other nations to refuse to participate in the SDI.

The Japanese scientists' campaign against the SDI is self-sponsored and operates without leadership, according to the local press.

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CSO: 5200/4010

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

FRG DEFENSE UNDERSECRETARY SUPPORTS U.S. VIEW ON ARMS CONTROL

Bonn RHEINISCHER MERKUR/CHRIST UND WELT in German 12 Oct 85 p 3

[Article by Undersecretary of Defense Lothar Ruehl: "False Weights on the Scales; Mikhail Gorbachev's Disarmament Proposals Can Only Lead to Progress if the Definition of Strategic Weapons is Correct"]

[Text] The new Soviet disarmament proposals, not yet accessible to the public in detail, are to be viewed against the background of the Soviet position that has developed during long years of negotiations. This position is set up like an extensive fortress with a central bastion, in which the hard core of the Soviet nuclear weapons power is shielded from the effects of agreed-upon arms control and a group of outworks in which a mobile defense can be conducted with occasional sorties and retreat battles.

All proposals made by Moscow in a decade and a half during the Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko eras since the start of the SALT negotiations in 1969 had as an objective nothing but maneuvers on the fortress glacis for the representation of arms limitations at the outer edge and for readiness to disarm without significant effects on the Soviet arsenal.

Thus the number of targetable Soviet nuclear warheads grew during the SALT process from roughly 2000 during the year of the Moscow SALT I agreement in 1972 to more than 9000 during 1985, the last year of the life of the SALT II agreement concluded in Vienna in 1979.

During the same period the Soviet Union modernized its strategic armed forces by the introduction of the SS-18 and SS-19 intercontinental missiles together with 4800 targetable nuclear warheads, i.e. more than twice the number necessary to attack each of the 1650 strategic missile silos in the United States with two nuclear charges. Since then two new ground-mobile intercontinental missiles of variable ranges for multiple attack systems (MIRVs) have been added--SS-24 and SS-25--one more than permissible according to the SALT II agreement of 1979. According to SALT II, even ground mobility of intercontinental missiles is prohibited.

Moreover, in SALT the Soviet Union kept its continental-strategic SS-20 missiles (range up to about 3000 kilometers), which are approaching intercontinental range, free of any restriction. The Soviet Union consistently

made use of this freedom to develop a threat potential, proportionate to the geographic distances of the Eurasian continent, with the SS-20's towards Europe and Asia. From 1976 to 1985 this potential grew to 441 launchers. Since early 1983, 243 of them have been operational in the European Soviet Union against NATO; an additional number is kept in readiness for operation sites which were built.

Removal of SS-20 Missiles not Enough

Gorbachev's announcement that these "additional" missile systems, which were set up "as a response" to the stationing of the U.S. intermediate-range weapons in Western Europe, would again be removed, their sites destroyed and the missiles, too, corresponds to the earlier Soviet plans, which have been known since late 1981: to keep 243 SS-20's operational in the European area.

It remains to be seen whether these systems will really be destroyed or kept as reserve. In any case, the ground mobility of the SS-20's means that removal merely out of the range to Western Europe would not suffice.

First of all, what is involved is the main concern: the equivalence of the offered reductions of the strategic weapons arsenals of the two powers and the effective application of the principle of equality of the arms limitations.

The criterion for that lies in the definition of the strategic weapons as laid down in the 1972 SALT I agreement and confirmed on 8 January 1985 in Geneva by the declaration of Foreign Minister Gromyko and Secretary of State Shultz. This brief declaration differentiates between "strategic" and "intermediate range" weapons, which must not be blurred.

The correct application of this criterion decides not only on the equal treatment of the two treaty partners, United States and USSR, but also on the equivalence of the security of the overseas allies of the United States with that of the Soviet Union, thus on the recognition of West Europe's security needs in relation to the Soviet Union. The known Soviet aim, for years clearly pursued in all Moscow proposals for negotiations and declarations on the subject, is to transform a formal strategic parity into a real disparity to the advantage of the Soviet Union by false counting criteria and yardsticks. The Western scale is to be loaded with U.S. weapons that are not "strategic," but are to be counted as such, while the Eastern scale remains free of corresponding Soviet weapons.

In this manner the Soviet Union tried as early as between 1981 and 1983 in the negotiations on "intermediate-range" weapons, in other words missiles and aircraft of intermediate range, to count on the U.S. side most nuclear-capable tactical U.S. combat aircraft which are kept in readiness in Europe and for Europe as "forward based" strategic weapons systems (FBS)--according to a one-sided Soviet definition. In 1981, the official Soviet estimate of these so-called FBS U.S. combat aircraft which could reach Soviet territory from their starting bases to begin with was 723 for Europe.

If such U.S. combat aircraft outside the North Atlantic-European area are also added, especially in Asia and in the Pacific on U.S. aircraft carriers (as

Moscow's estimate has been doing for the North Atlantic and the Mediterranean since 1981), then the total must correspondingly increase. Therefore, as a precautionary measure the question must be asked of Moscow whether actually different standards are to be used for both sides for the Geneva negotiations. Do the Soviets want to include U.S. combat aircraft, most of which have conventional missions and are part of the NATO air forces in Europe, as "strategic systems" in the number of "strategic weapons" to be reduced, while the comparable Soviet aircraft against Europe are not to be included?

In this case, the proposed equal reduction by 50 percent actually would have an unequal effect and could result in about twice as many real "strategic" missiles of intercontinental range remaining in the Soviet arsenal than on the Western side in the U.S. arsenal.

This question is imperative since the Soviet proposal includes intermediate-range weapons on the U.S. side contrary to the SALT treaty criteria but does not include them on the Soviet side--so that the Soviet SS-20 intermediate-range missiles worldwide and in Europe would remain outside the planned agreement. This means: The up to 572 U.S. intermediate-range missiles in Europe would be included, while the 441 Soviet SS-20 systems stationed in Europe and Asia would not be included. Moreover if freezing of stationing would be agreed to as of a fixed date, as the Soviet proposals always provide, then a disparity in "intermediate-range" systems in favor of the USSR on the order of magnitude of 2 : 1 would be imposed and the U.S. inferiority in Europe according to the number of operational warheads could be imposed at around 200 as compared with about 720 for 1985.

It is obvious that such unequal treaties on arms limitations are just as little or even less in the interest of the U.S. allies than they are in the interest of the United States itself.

Both formulations of the problem, that of the so-called "forward-based strategic" combat aircraft and that of the intermediate-range weapons are essential as regards the question whether the USSR accords equal security to Western Europe in case of arms control and whether or not real parity in case of strategic arms reductions is established.

This aspect also includes the question regarding the old Soviet demand from SALT to prohibit all "cruise missiles" with a range of 600 kilometers and more. If this were to be agreed to for the 50-percent reductions for strategic weapons, the disparity to the advantage of the East would be 108 to 243 intermediate range missiles or 108 to 729 operational warheads--always in line with Gorbachev's Paris speech.

These positions in the Gorbachev proposal along the lines of the classical Russian negotiating position, which thus far has not been relinquished or significantly changed, have caused U.S. Vice President George Bush to ask whether the proposed 50-percent reduction on both sides does not confront the West "with an illusion because of the manner of counting" and whether or not "U.S. armed forces would be reduced while comparable Soviet armed forces would remain unrestricted?"

Along these lines, Robert McFarlane, the President's security advisor, has publicly pointed out that the Gorbachev proposal in reality confronts the United States with the choice, after such only seemingly equal reductions to protect only itself or its allies overseas with the strategic weapons remaining to it.

A comparison of figures will make clear what is meant by that:

In 1985 the Soviet Union has at its disposal somewhat more than 2500 genuine strategic weapons systems with more than 9000 nuclear warheads, and in addition about 440 SS-20 continental missiles with over 1300 warheads.

In 1985 the United States has at its disposal roughly 2000 genuine strategic weapons with about 10,800 warheads.

Reductions of only the "strategic systems" by 50 percent would leave the Soviet side about 1250 delivery systems, the U.S. side 1000. This would provide an "approximate parity" with a Soviet surplus of 25 percent, which would considerably unbalance the scales of parity.

If the Gorbachev proposal were implemented according to the agreed-upon criteria for strategic systems and on the data base of the 1979 SALT II agreement, this would mean that both sides would have to reduce their key investments according to the double rule:

--no more than 6000 nuclear warheads and

--no more than 60 percent for the combat charges of this total for the various delivery components of the strategic armed forces.

The Principal Emphasis Remains Intact

The USSR would have to reduce its present about 6300 ground-based ICBM by 2700 to 3600, thus by about 45 percent.

The United States would have to decrease its 2500 sea-based SLBM by 1600 to 3600, thus by about 37 percent.

In the case of the ICBM, however, the United States would have the freedom for an increase as already it had in the SALT framework, in the case of the sea missiles the USSR. Both SALT partners would also have heavy bombers unrestricted, whereby the ban on all "cruise missiles" over 600 kilometers aimed for from the start by Moscow would revise the SALT regulation of 1979 and would force out of service the U.S. ALCM bombers (up to 120 are permitted according to SALT II) with their 12 "cruise missiles" each.

Thus if the Gorbachev proposal were applied to the SALT criteria according to the treaty and in force between both powers, it could in fact make substantial cuts in both strategic arsenals, however would take away relatively less from the mutual key factors than from the profiles of the other armed forces, for to obtain 3600 warheads in a single component, the number of

warheads in the two others would have to be limited to 2400.--At any rate, this would result in an approximately balanced reduction result on both sides.

Western Counterproposals Necessary for a Compromise

But if up to 900 or more U.S. aircraft and in addition intermediate-range missiles based in Europe would be counted, as the Soviet method of counting does with variants, then not roughly 2000 but about 3300 "strategic systems" would have to be assumed as starting figure for the United States; their reduction would leave about 1650 U.S. delivery systems. As a result the United States so as not to exceed the ceiling would have to remove from overseas, especially from Europe, either all aircraft counted as "strategic" for it by the USSR and the intermediate range missiles or reduce its strategic missiles and heavy bombers to less than 600.

The present roughly 2290 strategic missiles (ICBM and SLBM) and the 240 bombers of the USSR would have to be reduced to a total of about 1250 systems. The result would be that these 1250 strategic weapons carriers of the USSR, according to the existing Soviet definition criteria for strategic systems, would also be faced with about 1250 after a 50-percent reduction, but the United States would have to decide in return between a massive reduction of its land-based intercontinental missiles and a removal of its intermediate range weapons from overseas.

This alternative cannot be in the interest of the West. Western counterproposals could introduce a constructive compromise for really and also structurally balanced parity in the Geneva negotiations, as had already been done by the Reagan proposals of 1981 and 1983.

At any rate, Gorbachev, as the first Soviet leader, has offered substantial reductions even though the ceiling of his proposals with 6000 warheads is considerably above that by Reagan of 5000.

The comparison shows that the Soviet insistence on definition criteria to Russian advantage that are incompatible and moreover incorrect, distorts the whole picture and makes the proposal unacceptable.

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CSO: 5200/2553-F

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

GDR COMMENTARY ON GENEVA TALKS

Military, Political Considerations

LD261205 East Berlin Domestic Service in German 2110 GMT 25 Nov 85

[Heinz Britsche "Military-political commentary"]

[Text] The response to the Geneva meeting is predominantly positive. The world regards this encounter as a step in the right direction. The meeting is to be seen as encouraging, as Erich Honecker confirmed in his report to the 11th SED Central Committee session. In an improved climate, it is now a matter of going further along the road that is recognized as being right. The road markings are set out, if one thinks of the statement in the joint Soviet-American declaration of Geneva in which, after discussion of the key questions of security, the two sides stress the awareness of the special responsibility of the USSR and the United States for the preservation of peace, that a nuclear war must not be allowed to be unleashed, and that there can be no victor in such a war.

Proceeding from this, they again jointly stressed the importance of preventing any kind of war between them, nuclear or conventional. They will not strive for the attainment of military superiority. This has been for the Soviet Union a principled, irrevocable position since the existence of this equilibrium, because it is the only reasonable basis on which to protect from temptation those circles that devised various military confrontations and to put aside the means of force; and because it is also the only realistic basis on which to reduce simultaneously and in a balanced fashion the huge, fully stocked armed arsenals on both sides.

Any attempt on earth, or through space, to achieve military superiority can only stimulate the arms race and create dangers in space which were not even imaginable in the past. The prevention of the militarization of space is thus the condition for the radical reduction of nuclear armaments on earth. Here lies the key to success in the securing of peace. In his statement at Geneva the press conference Mikhail Gorbachev clearly expressed it: No one among us, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union may do anything so that the door is opened to the arms race in new spheres, specifically in space. For, if the doors to arms in space are opened, the scales of military rivalry are

immeasurably increased: Then--and this can be said already to a certain degree--the arms race would assume an irreversible character and would run out of control. In this case each side would have the feeling at every moment that it was somehow inferior and would be searching feverishly for ever new responses. All this would exacerbate the arms race, not merely in space, but also on earth, because the answers would not necessarily have to be in the same sphere, they would only have to be effective.

With this statement Mikhail Gorbachev made clear yet again how problematic it would be for the whole planet if the threshold of space armaments were crossed, that is to say, if offensive space weapons threatened from space, or other systems threatened space itself. Not only the armament process itself would get out of control, the power of decision, no less, would pass from the hands of politicians into those of the software-programmers of the computers because of the time factor, as the head of the American Strategic Defense Initiative program, General Abrahamson, has already stated. Precisely for this reason the door to space armaments must remain closed.

If both sides aver in the Geneva declaration that they are not striving for military superiority over the other, then this corresponds to reason and realism; provided that such a realization is followed by appropriate political behavior. Three U.S. presidents have already come to terms with strategic parity, have confirmed military equilibrium, even with their signatures on the relevant documents. The Soviet attitude has not changed, and cannot change on this question; it corresponds to cogent logic in policy. Mikhail Gorbachev said on this in Geneva: "We have told the President that we will not strive to achieve military superiority over the United States. More, still, I have tried many times in conversations between the two of us, and also in the plenary sessions, to express our deep conviction that less security for the United States in comparison with the Soviet Union would not be advantageous to us because this would arouse instability and feelings of mistrust. We await an analogous approach from the United States concerning ourselves. Also we told the President that on our side we would in no case allow the United States to achieve military superiority over us. Thus spoke Mikhail Gorbachev.

His words make it clear that military equilibrium is the only basis, the assurance of which is a duty of the socialist forces, the only basis for reasonable behavior, and primarily for negotiation, so that the arms arsenals on both sides are reduced and peace is stabilized.

Local Reaction

AU290920 [Editorial Report] East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German on 26 November on page 3 carries a 1,800-word article containing comments of GDR citizens on the Geneva summit and its results. The introduction to these comments states:

"The course and results of the meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and U.S. President Ronald Reagan in Geneva was met with a wide echo by the GDR citizens. This is expressed in vivid discussions based on the various publications--which were called very extensive

and informative--including the report on the meeting of the highest representatives of the Warsaw Pact member states in Prague.

"Unanimous agreement is paid to the party's standpoint which was explained by Erich Honecker, general secretary of the SED Central Committee, at the 11th SED Central Committee session. Undivided support is particularly given to the conclusion that now more than ever before it is necessary to struggle for peace and to make all efforts for progress in concluding agreements and for making peace more secure.

"The view is concurrently accepted that the talks and the achieved agreement are the result of the constructive peace policy and the persistent endeavors of the USSR, the GDR, and the other states of the socialist community for detente and disarmament.

"Discussions and expressions of opinion show that the majority of working people were looking to the meeting with some expectations but without illusions, and considers the achievements as they are expressed in the Joint Soviet-American Declaration, as an encouraging new start for a change for the better. They refer with satisfaction to the intention announced by both sides in the final document to work for preventing any war between the United States and the USSR and not to strive for military supremacy, as well as to accelerate Geneva arms control negotiations, and to reach the objectives agreed on 6 January 1985, mainly to prevent an arms race in space and to halt it on earth."

As an illustration of the above-mentioned opinions the paper subsequently published representative comments by 15 people: Siegfried Schmidt, worker in the Commern GDR Railroad Repair Yard; Hannelore Pauls, cooperative peasant, Brandhusen, Wismar Kreis; Juergen Hopf, Eisenberg Diecasting Company; Werner Schuett, Ernst Grube Automobile Factory, Werdau; Dr Gerhard Koch, Institute for Marxism-Leninism, Cottbus Engineering Construction College; Mrs Warnicke, housewife, Perleberg; Herbert Wagner, Friedrich Engels LPG, Bertheladorf; Dr Renate Mueller, Ilmenau Technical College; Dr Heinz Langer, Head physician of the Internal Medicine and Rheumatology Clinic, Dresden-Neustadt Bezirk hospital; 'Sixth Party Congress' Brigade, '8 May 1945' Special-Steel Plant VEB, Greital; Heidi Tetting, Nurse, Womrstedt Kreis hospital; Dr Heinrich Steinbrink, Christian Democratic Union of Germany, member of the Rostock-Suedstadt Community Church Council; Holger Sticherling, Zerbst Clothes Factory VEB; Dr Ulrich Abraham, Institute for Beet Research [institut fuer Ruebenforschung], Klein Wanzleben; Dietlinde Schmidt, 'Kaethe Kollwitz' nursery in Luckau.

Continuing Assessment

LD282227 East Berlin Voice of GDR Domestic Service in German 1605 GMT 28 Nov 85

[Gerd (Kurze) commentary]

[Text] A week has passed since the end of the Soviet-American summit in Geneva, and for almost a week the results of the talks beside Lake Geneva have been assessed at the highest level on both sides, by the CPSU General Secretary and

the U.S. President. In his speech to the Supreme Soviet yesterday Mikhail Gorbachev gave a thorough assessment of what has been achieved and what is still to be achieved, because the question is not: How do things proceed following Geneva? Here is a commentary from Gerd (Kurze).

During the first period in office of U.S. President Ronald Reagan, the Soviet United States and Canada Institute published a study in which the Moscow academics came to the conclusion that each of the U.S. presidents of the post-war period who was elected twice pursued a better policy in his second period of office than in his first 4 years of administration. Better policy--by this the Soviet academics meant primarily a foreign policy that takes account of the categorical imperative of our time: live together and get on with one another, because the alternative to this is joint destruction. Applied to relations between the USSR and the United States, this certainly means each accepting the other, and not allowing the fundamental contradiction between the two social orders represented by the United States and the USSR to degenerate into a military clash. From this follows a practical policy that should always endeavor to strengthen the so-called strategic stability in the world, particularly between the United States and the Soviet Union. Precisely this is contained in the joint Soviet-U.S. Geneva statement: No war; maintenance of the parity of the military-strategic balance; consolidation of the strategic stability.

After 5 years of the Reagan administration this seems to be a sign of improvement. The second period in office of the current U.S. President seems to be following a similar rule to that of his predecessors. The Soviet general secretary in a certain sense confirmed this yesterday in his assessment. The constructive, consistent policy of our country has without doubt contributed decisively, Gorbachev told the Supreme Soviet, to the achievement of a result that permits hope. At the same time it would be unjust not to emphasize that in the attitude of the American side at the meeting certain elements of realism were to be noted, which contributed to the solution of some questions. Of course, the real significance of everything useful that we agreed in Geneva can only express itself in practical actions, Gorbachev said.

And this is the issue: the path that the Reagan administration will not follow after the summit. Because, and the Soviet party leader spoke fully on this yesterday, there are powerful forces in the United States which did not want Geneva, which did everything beforehand to make the meeting between the two leading politicians impossible. Caspar Weinberger as chief of the Pentagon, where he is closest among leading figures in Washington to those in the administration who place the orders for armaments, and to those in industry who receive the orders, went so far as to send the President a letter imploring him to enter any agreements with the Soviets that could in any way interfere with America's arms drive.

In view of this situation it is not surprising that Gorbachev yesterday stressed: We value the personal contact established with the President. Dialogue between the highest representatives is always a moment of truth in relations between states. It is important that such a dialogue took place. In the current complicated time it is in itself a stabilizing factor. In the past few

days the Soviet leadership has several times assessed the results of Geneva and has each time, apart from paying tribute to the hopeful elements, gone into the mass of questions that remain open. A further hard struggle within and outside the United States, as before Geneva, will be needed to answer them.

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CSO: 5200/3015

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

BRIEFS

ITALIAN ENVOY MEETS SHEVARDNADZE--The Italian Government's positive assessment of the results of the Soviet-American summit in Geneva is reiterated in the message which Premier Craxi sent to the Soviet leader, Gorbachev, and through the Italian ambassador in Moscow, Sergio Romano, who handed it to the Soviet foreign minister, Shevardnadze, yesterday in the Kremlin. During their talks the Soviet foreign minister expressed his appreciation of the good and constructive relations between Rome and Moscow and said he was convinced that bilateral cooperation rests on a stable basis and could be developed dynamically. [Text] [Rome Domestic Service in Italian 2300 GMT 10 Dec 85] /8309

CSO: 5200/2589

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

XINHUA REPORT ON EUROPEAN SECURITY WORRIES

00100820 Beijing XINHUA in English 0746 GMT 18 Dec 85

["Year-ender: Superpower Rivalries -- European Worries and Uneasiness (by Xia Zhimian)"
-- XINHUA headline]

[Text] Bonn, December 17 (XINHUA) -- The heated debates over Euro-missiles and the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) during the past three years symptomise the European uneasiness over the intensified arms race between the superpowers and their own security.

During the "detente" of the 1970s, the Soviet Union gradually deployed massive SS-20 medium-range missiles in East Europe, which gave the region an edge over West Europe in medium-range missiles. In response, the United States insisted that its European allies agree to deploy U.S. medium-range missiles on their soils in conformity with provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

In the fall of 1983, debate on Euro-missiles ruptured West Europeans, who found themselves facing a difficult choice: They could either refuse the U.S. missile deployment to offset Soviet missile superiority, or they could accede to the U.S. demand, thereby becoming a nuclear base more accessible for the United States and a target more vulnerable to the Soviet attack. The debate concerned not only West Europeans but East Europeans as well, because the deployment of U.S. missiles in West Europe could spark fresh deployment of Soviet medium-range missiles in East Europe.

While the Euro-missile crisis festered, another debate burst into the political arena in March. The new debate was sparked by the U.S. invitation to Western European countries to participate in its development of the SDI -- a Soviet missile-targeted space defence system. The Soviet Union reacted by issuing a stern warning to Washington and exerted strong political and diplomatic pressure on the West European governments.

West European countries fear that by participating in SDI, they would be drawn into the superpower arms race in outer space. The dilemma is so acute that even West Germany, one of the closest U.S. allies, feels hesitant to finalize its decision. At the same time, East European countries too share the uneasiness and worries of their Western counterparts over the escalation of the arms race into outer space.

The two debates reflect the differences in interests between the superpowers and the European countries.

For the superpowers, Europe is a stage for their global rivalry where neither side can establish military superiority. Therefore, the two sides compete with each other in both the quality and quantity of missile systems deployed in the continent. Although the European countries still belong to two antagonistic military blocs, fundamentally, they feel less secure as they are further involved in superpower arms race and have more missiles deployed on their soils.

It is from this feeling of insecurity that the Netherlands delayed for two years its final agreement on deploying 48 cruise missiles on its soil, while a few East European countries expressed unhappiness at the deployment by the Soviet Union of more missiles on their territories. For that same reason, most West European countries have declined the U.S. invitation to participate in SDI. West European countries are also uneasy at the possible disjointing of their defence cooperation with the United States, which might be caused by the deployment of U.S. medium-range missiles and the space defence systems.

The deployment of U.S. medium-range missiles to defuse the threat of Soviet missiles is a double-edged sword. While it is indeed in the interest of West Europe, it also makes it possible for the United States to wage a war in the future with medium-range missiles in the West European countries instead of strategic missiles in its own territory, thus restricting a nuclear war to Europe. As for SDI, some Western military experts believe it is designed to shoot down strategic missiles travelling at a high altitude and may be of little use in protecting West European ground targets from Soviet medium-range missiles, which travel at much lower altitude.

Expressing his concerns at the possibility of disjointing European and U.S. defense, the Inspector-General of Bundeswehr Wolfgang Altenburg said on November 29 that the security of the NATO countries could not be categorized. He said that the "community of risk" can not be allowed to disintegrate and that "limited and local conflict" was strategically unacceptable.

The shared uneasiness among Europeans is changing their international outlook and, in the long run, the situation in Europe. This change is reflected in the surging demand in Europe for disarmament, in closer inter-European cooperation and in multi-lateral disarmament negotiations.

As another aspect of the change in Europe, West European countries are also strengthening their independent defenses, expanding cooperation in weapons production, reviving the West European Union and developing European high-tech program, "Eureka".

After the U.S.-Soviet summit last month, Europeans felt some relief at the relaxation in East-West tension. But as the West German magazine DIE ZEIT pointed out, Europeans know that "the policies of big powers are determined by their interests, not by atmosphere." Although the summit in Geneva improved the political atmosphere, the disarmament positions of both sides remained unchanged. The uneasiness and worry in Europe, therefore, still lingers -- and one suspects, is likely to linger for quite some time yet.

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CSO: 5200/4015

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

BRIEFS

TASS ON NETHERLANDS CRUISE DECISION--The Hague November 14 TASS--Holland's ruling coalition of the Christian Democrats and right-wing liberals has secured the voting down of the Labor Party's motion in the second chamber of Parliament on reversing the government decision to accept deployment of U.S. cruise missiles in the country. Thereby the Parliament has confirmed the government's deployment decision. However, the voting has shown that the parliamentary majority that advocate the siting of 48 U.S. missiles at the Woensdrecht military base is rather thin, and there is no unity over this question even inside the ruling coalition. Six Christian Democrats supported, together with all left-wing parties, the Labor Party's motion. It was with difficulty that the ruling bourgeois parties polled votes to turn down the motion, which reflects the demands of the majority of the Dutch population, by winning over to their side representatives of small reactionary groupings. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 0821 GMT 14 Nov 85 LD] /6091

CSO: 5200/1184

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

TASS ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS, DISARMAMENT FORUM HELD IN VIENNA

LD062224 Moscow TASS in English 1043 GMT 6 Dec 85

[Text] Vienna, December 6 TASS -- TASS correspondent Anatoliy Tyupayev reports:

"Chemical weapons and disarmament problems" is the subject of the "public forum" which was held in the Austrian capital on the initiative of the International Peace Institute. The forum was attended by representatives of public organizations and the Austrian Peace Movement, scholars. Academician Karl Heinz Lohs, member of the GDR delegation at the Geneva disarmament talks, pointed out the need for vigorous efforts to achieve a ban on chemical weapons, which are one of the most dangerous mass destruction weapons. He pointed out the special danger of the programme drawn up in the United States to produce binary chemical weapons and equip the U.S. Armed Forces with them.

These weapons are to be deployed in the territory of a number of West European countries, above all the FRG, which is a source of tremendous danger to the peoples of the European Continent.

The speaker evaluated the initiative of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SUPG) and the Social-Democratic Party of Germany, FRG, to create in Europe a zone free from chemical weapons including the GDR, FRG, and Czechoslovakia as an important contribution to improving the political climate and ensuring an atmosphere of international trust. He stressed that this initiative meets with full support from the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, all forces declaring for an immediate resolution of the problem of a ban on chemical weapons.

The participants in the meeting pointed out the importance of new effective steps for a general and complete ban on chemical weapons and destruction of their stocks.

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CSO: 5200/1182

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

TASS: PROPOSED CHEMICAL ARMS FUNDING HARMS SUMMIT ACCORD

LD040145 Moscow TASS in English 2058 GMT 3 Dec 85

["Chemical Weapons Must Be Banned"--TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow December 3 TASS -- TASS commentator Vadim Biryukov writes:

The U.S. newspaper PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER reported that the U.S. Congress is considering a bill envisaging the appropriation of nearly 1,100 million dollars in the 1986 financial year to the programme of modernization of chemical arms. The Pentagon intends to spend those funds on research and development of new highly toxic chemicals for warheads, manufacture of vaccines and antidotes, sensors, protective clothing, shelters and computer programmes imitating combat situations with the use of chemical weapons. The Pentagon also intends to use those funds to start the production of the 155mm shells and 200-kilogram "Big Eye" bombs with nerve gas.

The newspaper's reports indicate that the military-industrial complex of the USA has concrete plans for perfection and manufacture of new particularly dangerous types of chemical arms and is not going to give them up. Meanwhile the joint Soviet-U.S. statement on the results of the Geneva summit meeting says: "In the context of discussing security problems, the two sides reaffirmed that they are in favour of a general and complete prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of existing stockpiles of such weapons. They agreed to accelerate efforts to conclude an effective and verifiable international convention on this matter."

The historic significance of the Geneva meeting is known to all, but its long-term significance will be manifested in concrete deeds and depends on the readiness of the sides to act on the basis of the joint statement adopted in Geneva. The time has come to pass on from words to deeds and to take practical steps to prohibit and destroy stockpiles of chemical arms. But certain circles in Washington are striving to bring pressure on the American legislators and to achieve the appropriation of funds for the production of new types of toxic warfare agents.

Trying to convince the U.S. Congress that the stockpiles of chemical arms existing in the USA become "obsolete" or are "insufficient", the U.S. military-industrial complex is above all concerned over its profits. The monopolists little worry about the circumstance that the U.S. tax payers will have to produce more toxic agents while the U.S. arsenals contain at least 150,000 tons of toxic agents, the amount which is enough to kill all the population of the earth several times over.

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CSO: 5200/1182

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

IZVESTIYA CITES USSR CDE DELEGATION CHIEF

PM141647 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Nov 85 Morning Edition p 4

[Report by correspondent A. Sychev: "For a Constructive Approach"]

[Text] Stockholm--The eighth session of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe is continuing work in the Swedish capital.

O.A. Grinevskiy, leader of the Soviet delegation and ambassador at large, addressed the routine session. He stressed the Soviet Union's unwavering desire to strengthen peace and fundamentally improve the international political climate. Achieving these goals requires a new approach to politics in accord with the realities of the modern world, which can only be preserved by following the path of detente and excluding the use of force from the practice of international relations.

The Stockholm conference has understood the need to confirm and concretize the principle of the nonuse of force and give it the most binding character possible, a need that was expressed in the socialist countries' proposal to conclude a treaty on the mutual nonuse of military force and the maintenance of relations of peace. The representatives of certain countries, including Cyprus, Sweden, Finland, Italy, Denmark, and others, expressed interesting ideas during the session on ways and forms of increasing the effectiveness of an international commitment of this kind.

The Soviet representative stressed that under present-day conditions confidence-building measures in the military sphere will only be effective when they are combined with political confidence- and security-building moves. He restated that the Soviet Union agrees to examine the range of concrete confidence-building measures determined during the previous session as capable of leading to accords.

The way matters have developed at the conference shows that it is time to abandon the attempt to slow down the pace of its work and remove the artificial obstacles in the way of objective talks. Mutual understanding and a united, constructive approach are needed for the elaboration of substantial complementary confidence- and security-building measures in Europe of both a political and a military character, the Soviet delegation leader stressed.

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CSO: 5200/1183

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

WESTERN MBFR RESPONSE TO WARSAW PACT PROPOSAL NOTED

TASS Report

LD051701 Moscow TASS in English 1645 GMT 5 Dec 85

[Text] Vienna, 5 Dec (TASS)--The closing plenary session of a regular round of talks on the mutual reduction of the armed forces and armaments in central Europe here has been addressed by representatives of the United States and Great Britain. They set forth in general form the NATO countries' response to the proposal advanced by the socialist countries on 14 February 1985 for the initial reduction by the Soviet Union and the United States of the land troops and armaments in central Europe and the subsequent non-increase in the levels of the armed forces and armaments of the sides in the region.

The head of the Soviet delegation, V.V. Mikhaylov, speaking later, said that the considerations set out by the Western side will be, naturally, thoroughly studied to determine how far they may facilitate in breaking the deadlock and achieving a concrete result at the talks. The Soviet representative noted as the first impression that, formally, the NATO countries seem to accept the pattern of the initial agreement tabled by the Warsaw Treaty countries, but that they fill it with a dubious content.

The counter-proposal by the Western parties to the talks bear the mark of a longstanding fault in their stance: On the one hand, they stubbornly reduce to nought everything that would result in a real reduction in the level of military confrontation in Europe, like, for instance, the reduction and limitation of armaments, while on the other hand, they seek to impose overblown verification measures, taking no account of reality. All this does not contribute to reaching a mutually acceptable agreement. The Western side's response does not inspire optimism.

AFP Report

AU051818 Paris AFP in English 1809 GMT 5 Dec 85

[Text] Vienna, 5 Dec (AFP)--The Atlantic Alliance has proposed to the Warsaw Pact the withdrawal of 11,500 Soviet and 5,000 U.S. troops from Central Europe and a subsequent 3-year freeze in the number of their respective forces, sources at the Mutual and Balanced Forces Reduction (MBFR) talks here said today.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization offer, responding to one in February by the Warsaw Pact, came at the 37th session of the stalled MBFR negotiations. The accord would become effective a year after an agreement was signed, the sources said. It was NATO's first troops reduction proposal.

The Warsaw Pact had suggested in February that the United States withdraw 13,000 troops from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union 20,000.

Michael Alexander, head of the British delegation, said NATO governments had "concluded that the approach in the East's basic provisions, despite their imperfections, might form a framework on which the two sides could work together with some hope of reaching an agreement."

Valerian Mikhailov, the Soviet ambassador to the MBFR talks, hailed the NATO response, but said verification measures including in the Western plan did not leave room for optimism. The West, he said, tried "to impose excessively inflated verification measures disregarding existing realities." "The response by the Western side does not give cause for optimism," he added.

Soviet spokesman N.V. Seiland also complained that the proposal had only been presented on the last day of talks, which, he said, was "not very fair play."

Robert Blackwill, the head of the U.S. delegation, said the offer was "a sign of (NATO's) determination to produce a breakthrough in these negotiations," and predicted that "intense negotiations could now begin."

The NATO proposal makes no mention of establishing a mutually acceptable troop count, a previous Western [passage indistinct] any agreement on reducing troops.

Both sides agree on bringing troops down to 900,000 each, but NATO holds that Warsaw Pact forces in Eastern Europe are stronger by 180,000 than the figures given by Moscow.

The new NATO proposal also calls for:

--exchange of a list of units to be withdrawn by the United States and the Soviet Union;

--commitment not to redeploy those troops in other European theaters;

--creation of permanent control points to be mandatorily crossed by withdrawing troops;

--and 30 annual inspections by each side during the 3 years following the troop reduction.

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CSO: 5200/1183

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

BRIEFS

IMPORTANCE OF ACCORD STRESSED--Stockholm, 6 Dec (TASS)--Major General Viktor Tatarnikov, member of the Soviet delegation, has addressed today a session at the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. He stressed the importance of reaching agreement on preliminary notification about large-scale exercises of ground troops, air force and navy in Europe and in the sea and ocean areas adjoining it, as well as in the air space. Until now the resolution of the major issue has met with opposition from the United States and other NATO member-countries, using all sorts of far-fetched pretexts to oppose the application of confidence-building measures to such strike forces as air force and navy. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1114 GMT 6 Dec 85]

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CSO: 5200/1183

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

PRAVDA PROPOSES ADDITIONAL TESTING VERIFICATION

LD190016 Moscow TASS in English 2359 GMT 18 Dec 85

[Text] Moscow, December (TASS)--The newspaper PRAVDA published the following article under the headline "Nuclear Blasts Should Be Banned" in its December 19 issue:

"Since nuclear arms were unleashed like an evil spirit out of the Manhattan Project in the summer of 1945, mankind has been waging a stubborn struggle for limiting and ultimately eliminating these weapons of mass annihilation. The campaign against nuclear weapons has become an international, truly worldwide movement uniting members of most different classes, ideologies and professions. This is only natural since the matter at issue is removing the threat to the very life on earth and ensuring a peaceful future for the present and succeeding generations.

An important part of this problem is the issue of putting an end to nuclear weapons tests. It is common knowledge that testing is a kind of motor propelling the nuclear arms race. It is tests that make it possible to try out new, still more sophisticated and deadly types of these weapons and upgrade them. And this, for its part, fuels the process of stockpiling more and more nuclear ammunition in the form of warheads on cruise missiles, ICBM's, submarine-launched missiles and so on.

There has come to light of late yet another, exceptionally dangerous aspect of the nuclear experiments: In shafts and drifts at the Nevada testing range in the United States they are trying out lasers powered by nuclear explosions with a view to using them in "star wars" making plans for which keeps American strategic thinking most busy.

In short, continued nuclear testing is a source of increasing tension, a growing war threat and deepening mistrust among nations.

This is why from the very start of the nuclear era the Soviet Union has been and continues pressing consistently for an end to nuclear weapons testing. It should be said that the efforts by the Soviet side and all peace-minded forces towards this goal have not been wasted.

The early 1960's saw the conclusion of a multilateral treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and underwater, which is still valid. Under the 1974 treaty the USSR and the United States have agreed to limit the yields of underground nuclear weapons explosions to 150 kilotons. The Soviet-U.S. treaty of 1976 has set strict rules also with regard to underground nuclear blasts for peaceful purposes. Significant progress was achieved at tripartite talks, which were once conducted by the USSR, the United States and Britain, on a general and complete prohibition of nuclear weapons tests, that is a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons testing everywhere -- in the atmosphere, in outer space, underwater or underground.

Regrettably, the 1974 and 1976 treaties have remained unratified to this day, and not through the USSR's fault. It is not at all on our initiative that the tripartite talks, too, have been broken off.

A complete end to nuclear tests thus remains among the pressing problems of present-day international politics. Mikhail S. Gorbachev stressed: "As time goes on, the question of bringing nuclear tests to a halt is becoming more and more acute. First of all, because this would put an end to the development of new and the upgrading of existing types of nuclear weapons. Further, because without testing, without renewal, there would gradually unfold the process of withering away of nuclear arsenals, necrotizing of nuclear weapons. Lastly, because the nuclear explosions, and they number in the hundreds, should no longer be allowed to deface our beautiful earth, heightening concern about how the succeeding generations will be able to live on it."

World public concern about the continuing nuclear tests and strong public sentiments for an end to them have showed in the known call of the leaders of six states of different continents, namely Argentina, Greece, Mexico, India, Tanzania and Sweden, on the USSR and the United States to agree on a reciprocal end to nuclear testing. They also urged an early conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. A similar call was recently made also by the U.N. General Assembly. A message to the Soviet and U.S. leaders on this score from a group of eminent scientists, Nobel Prize winners, has evoked broad international response.

Eager to move the issue of terminating tests from the dead center, the Soviet Union last summer made a major initiative, by halting all kinds of nuclear blasts unilaterally as of August 6 and urging the U.S. Government to follow suit. As has been declared, the Soviet moratorium will remain in effect until January 1, 1986, but it can be extended beyond that date if the United States joins the moratorium as well.

As it took that step, the Soviet Government was guided by a desire to check the further buildup and upgrading of nuclear armories, which have continued now for more than 40 years. In other words, a joint Soviet-U.S. moratorium on any nuclear explosions would become a major landmark on the way towards eliminating the nuclear danger.

The Soviet Union's decision has been highly appreciated throughout the world and won extensive support. But in Washington they have, at least as yet, taken a different approach to it. Using all manner of far-fetched pretexts or sometimes making no arguments at all, they have taken care to leave our calls for a joint moratorium without a positive response. The crash program for underground nuclear weapons testing in the United States is continuing to be carried out.

All this cannot but arouse legitimate concern. For if the U.S. Administration keeps ignoring the proposal for renouncing nuclear explosions, this will lead to the Soviet commitments under the unilateral moratorium becoming no longer valid after the announced deadline which is only a short time away. For obvious reasons, in the face of military preparations overseas, the USSR cannot sacrifice the interests of its security and the security of its allies and friends.

The Soviet people, however, do not at all want the competition in the nuclear field to go on. It is imperative to do everything lest the favorable chance to end nuclear testing, which has been created by the USSR's efforts, be missed. Although time for this, we repeat, is running out, there is still enough of it left to take the right, well-considered decision.

It should be clearly realized that if there really is an intention to move towards an end to the nuclear arms race, a mutual moratorium cannot draw any objections, while the benefit from it would be big. An end to nuclear blasts is an issue on which concrete results, and tangible and palpable ones at that, can be achieved right now. The political significance of such a joint step by the USSR and the United States would be great. It would give a certain signal also to the other nuclear powers and create a qualitatively new situation which would be much more felicitous for a positive development of the process started by the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Geneva and for effective practical measures to reverse the arms race.

The resumption of the tripartite talks on a comprehensive nuclear test ban would certainly be a real step in the same direction. The Soviet side is prepared for it to be taken without delay, in the very beginning of next year.

When examining the issue of a moratorium on nuclear explosions, in the West, most notably in the United States, they plead the difficulties of verification. It is well-known, however, that both the Soviet Union and the United States have very sophisticated national technical means to enable them to reliably verify the moratorium.

Denouncing any nuclear explosions for either military or civilian purposes, as the Soviet Union has done now, would provide an extra guarantee of effective verification. With the testing being silent and no peaceful nuclear blasts being conducted, neither side would risk violating the moratorium and assuming grave political responsibility for such a step before the entire world public.

In order to increase the effectiveness of verification, in which the USSR has a direct interest, the Soviet Union has supported also the idea of using an international verification system.

With this in mind, it would be possible to take advantage, for instance, of the proposal of six states for setting up special monitoring stations in their territories to verify compliance with the accord on ending tests.

The Soviet Union is prepared to go even further. It stands for coming to terms with the United States, in establishing now a moratorium on nuclear explosions, also on certain measures or on-site verification to remove the possible doubts about compliance with such a moratorium.

The verification problem thus cannot be seen as an impediment to reaching agreement on a mutual moratorium. It is quite soluble and the Soviet Union proposes concrete ways of resolving it in a mutually acceptable way.

For the joint Soviet-U.S. moratorium on any nuclear blasts to become a reality, one thing is needed, and that is a political will to move along the road of adopting concrete measures to reverse the arms race and eliminate the war threat. In other words, the road of implementing the positive results of the Geneva meeting.

It is to be hoped that Washington will display a constructive approach to the moratorium issue. The interests of all nations, including the people of the United States, urgently require an end to nuclear testing. The American Administration has every opportunity to respond to the people's aspirations and come to terms with the Soviet Union on a joint moratorium on any nuclear blasts."

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CSO: 5200/1192

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

NEW ISSUES, CONFLICTS EMERGE DURING NORDIC CONFERENCE

Major National Differences Appear

PM041513 Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 30 Nov 85 p 8

[Report by Thorkild Dahl: "Disagreement on Treaty-Enshrined Nuclear-Free Zone"]

[Excerpts] The governments of Sweden and Finland believe and hope that in the longer term it will be possible to create a treaty-enshrined Nordic nuclear-free zone, while both the Norwegian and Danish government's are keeping the zone idea at arm's length.

This emerged clearly from speeches yesterday when 100 politicians from the five Nordic countries discussed the Nordic area as a nuclear-free zone at the conference at Christiansborg. The conference continues today.

The man behind the initiative for the conference, Danish Social Democratic Party Chairman Anker Jorgensen, called the meeting a historic occasion which gathered politicians from over 50 parties represented in the Nordic Parliaments to discuss security policy.

Danish Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen (Liberal Party) also said that Nordic security cannot be viewed in isolation from European security.

"In the whole of this discussion we must be careful not to create 'false' security," the foreign minister said, going on to mention the nonaggression treaty [with Germany] which preceded 9 April 1940 [date of German attack on Denmark in World War II].

"Against this background there are not very many people here in Denmark who seriously believe that a formalized Nordic nuclear-free zone will have any real meaning if the worst happens--if war comes in Europe," Uffe Ellemann-Jensen said.

Several Icelandic politicians stressed that a nuclear-free zone must be seen in the proper context of East-West relations.

Greenland Prime Minister Jonathan Motzfeldt said that Greenland adheres to its policy of NATO membership, but added that all three Greenland parties support the efforts being made to create a nuclear-free zone in the Nordic area.

At the opening of the conference at Christiansborg Nordic peace movements and trade unions held a torchlight procession outside the Folketing.

New Discussion Phase Beginning

PM110937 Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 3 Dec 85 p 4

[Jan-Magnus Jansson editorial: "Change of Climate in the Zone Debate"]

[Text] One reflection presents itself after the parliamentarians' meeting in Copenhagen on the Nordic nuclear-free zone: The climate of discussion on the zone issue has definitely changed. We are on the verge of a new phase in the chain of events which began with the Norwegian Labor Party's zone resolution at its congress in Hamar in 1981, or perhaps even earlier, when former Minister Jens Evensen made a much-reported statement that shocked many people in support of a nuclear-free zone.

The meeting in Copenhagen confirmed what we already know: That no party of any importance in the Nordic area says an absolute "no" to the plans for a nuclear-free zone. However, there are varying degrees of enthusiasm or hesitancy. Those parties--particularly the Conservatives in Norway and Denmark--which want to wait and see, surround their positions with so many reservations that in practice they end up as "noes," at least in the present situation.

However, we should not underestimate the importance for a softer climate of discussion of the fact that all parties consider it possible to debate the zone issue at least hypothetically. A few years ago a meeting like the one in Copenhagen would have been unthinkable.

An area in which pan-Nordic agreement is also possible is official investigations of the zone and the conditions attaching to it. It would be a milestone here too if representatives of all the Nordic countries were to sit down together around the same table. National investigations, even very ambitious ones, are already to hand. One of the most thorough is the Norwegian Colding report. Investigations, only published in part, have been made in Sweden and Denmark, and in Finland a thorough piece of research work was done prior to Kekkonen's famous speech in Stockholm in 1978.

Since 1978 investigative work in Finland has slowed down, and at the first Copenhagen conference a year ago the Finnish delegates were clearly badly prepared. There is very good reason for Foreign Minister Vayrynen to have set up a working group chaired by Under Secretary of State Klaus Tornudd to continue the researches begun in the seventies. The intention is that the group will produce both a study for publication and background material for Finnish decisions in the future.

However, the step from national investigations to pan-Nordic investigations, whereby the various countries' representatives will try to find common ground, is a long one. In Copenhagen the Social Democrats spoke out in favour of a Nordic parliamentarians' working group on the zone issue and proposed, taking as their point of departure the call from the Finnish Social Democratic Party leader, that the Nordic governments should also set up a joint civil servants' working group on the issue. The parliamentary working group, whose members would be chosen from the parties represented in the parliaments of the various countries and according to the rules followed in each parliament, is probably not very difficult to create, whereas the civil servants' group would require lengthier consideration.

The fact that interest in the zone has increasingly moved over from the government to the parliamentary and party level has greatly broadened the debate. At the same time it has brought party tactics and party differences into the debate. It is an open question how the Labor Party in Norway and the Social Democrats in Denmark would move on the issue if they won government responsibility. The Schlueter and Willoch governments are painfully aware that public opinion in favor of activity on the zone issue is growing. A section on Willoch's parliamentary base, particularly within the Center Party, is also more favorably disposed to a zone than the prime minister and his own party.

While the Social Democrats at least do not seem prepared to push the zone before possible future detente arrangements, the Danish and Norwegian governments' official positions are, first, that an isolated Nordic zone arrangement is out of the question and, second, that all such arrangements would require an understanding with NATO. No one opposes this latter stance; on the contrary, such a precondition was tacitly contained in, for example, President Kekkonen's 1978 speech, which stressed that the leading nuclear powers should guarantee the zone. When Danish Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen asserted that a definite "no" to nuclear arms cannot be reconciled with NATO membership this was a very tough interpretation which leaves one wondering. Because a relatively widespread body of opinion asserts the opposite--that NATO membership need not be upset by a nuclear-free zone.

It is a different matter what NATO and its main power, the United States, would say in the present situation to proposals that would mean even modest progress toward a Nordic nuclear-free zone. As long as the United States adopts a stance of categorically rejecting the zone, the Nordic countries' efforts seem pretty vain. One could, of course, argue that it would be easier for the Americans to turn a blind eye to the Nordic activities now that they have gotten their way with the deployment of medium-range missiles in the West European countries. What was dangerous in 1983 would no longer be so dangerous. However, even in the present situation the United States probably sees no reason to agree to a plan which does not bring with it any concrete advantages for its strategy.

Shifting the center of gravity of the zone discussion to parliaments and parties, and in the final analysis to the level of the voters, does at least

bring with it new effects, which could perhaps have world political repercussions. First: How long is the section of public opinion which favors the zone willing to wait for commissions of investigation and debates? As long as the zone plan lay around on the shelves of the Finnish Foreign Ministry and was taken down from time to time and looked at, there was not that element of popular pressure which undoubtedly exists nowadays.

Second: If at some point the Nordic parliaments and governments were to agree on the desirability of immediately establishing a zone, could NATO oppose it without jeopardizing Norway's and Denmark's loyalty? Danish Social Democrat Lasse Budtz has said that it goes without saying that in such a situation NATO will have to yield. Certainly not everyone shares his confidence, but the question deserves to be asked.

However, one thing at least is clear: The strong body of public opinion today makes it unlikely that nuclear arms could be deployed in the Nordic area even during a serious international crisis. It is like going against the direction of motion on a surface that is moving at full speed: Perhaps one does not move forward, but one does at least guarantee not moving backward.

Atlantic Islands a Factor

PM051605 Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 2 Dec 85 p 7

[Dispatch by Lars Christiansson: "Atlantic Islands a New Factor"]

[Text] Copenhagen--Two new factors have now been added to the discussions in the Nordic area of a nuclear-free zone. First, it is clear that future consideration of the zone must also take account of Greenland, the Faeroes, and Iceland. Second, it is clear that Finland has taken very seriously the recent Norwegian Foreign Ministry report which was very negative toward the zone idea.

This is how we can summarize the two new elements from the pan-Nordic parliamentarians' conference in Copenhagen on a nuclear-free zone in the Nordic area. The conference ended Saturday [30 November].

During the conference parliamentarians from Greenland, Iceland, and the Faeroes came forward to speak. Their common theme, even though their enthusiasm for the zone varied, was that future discussions of a Nordic zone can be carried further without account being taken of the special interests of these west Nordic areas.

In simple terms this means that the continued discussion of the Nordic zone must take account of a new geographical dimension. This covers not only the land areas involved, but also the question of whether the North Atlantic should not also be embraced by the zone arrangement. This adds to the zone idea and all its still-unresolved problems several complicated new dimensions, since this sea area is of very great strategic importance for both the Soviet Union's and the Western alliance's nuclear arms carriers, in the air, at sea

and under the sea. For example, nuclear-armed submarines from both military pacts are constantly patrolling there. The fact that these sea areas are also entering the picture now complicates all the other unresolved questions concerning the extent of the zone, the possibilities of verifying nuclear-free status, and so forth.

Like Denmark, Greenland is covered by NATO's nuclear option. Iceland has no real defenses of its own but relies entirely on NATO and the United States and on the Western alliance's nuclear option, to mention some more of the problems which could come into the zone discussion.

Alongside the new dimensions added to the zone debate in the contributions from the "west Nordic nations," Finnish Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen's address attracted great interest.

Vayrynen declared that the final impulse for the appointment of a Finnish expert group to investigate the zone was the publication of Norway's so-called Colding report. This report is very pessimistic about the possibility of setting up a Nordic nuclear-free zone. As Vayrynen said, it confirmed "again Norway's position that a nuclear-free zone in the Nordic area can only be set up in the context of a broader European arrangement."

By linking the new appointed Finnish investigation group to the results of the Colding report, Vayrynen made it clear that Finland too is aware of several of the problems pointed out in the Norwegian report and that Finland has reached the conclusion that in Helsinki too an attempt must again be made to take a penetrating look at all the questions attaching to the zone. The Finnish view is, as SVENSKA DAGBLADET has already reported, that the establishment of a Nordic nuclear-free zone is a very long-term project.

But Vayrynen made much of the fact that the Colding report also talks about the importance of confidence-building measures of the type being discussed at the Stockholm conference.

As a result he was able to return again to his idea of "alongside the central objective, a nuclear-free zone in the Nordic area," also considering special confidence-building measures for the northern European area. He also said that in the Finnish view these measures should also affect Soviet territory.

It was clear from Vayrynen's address that he was talking about farther-reaching confidence- and security-building measures to cover conventional arms for northern Europe than for the rest of Europe.

What the Finnish foreign minister was understood to be talking about were far-reaching confidence- and security-building measures such as advance notification of military maneuvers and troop movements in the region and the possibility of checking on and observing these. The Foreign Ministry in Helsinki has noted that Norway has been willing to go further than the other NATO states at the Stockholm conference and advocates that even quite small

military exercises should be subject to advance notification procedures and possible attendance by observers.

It is this, according to information received by SVENSKA DAGBLADET, that has caused Vayrynen to see a possibility of taking an initiative at the present time in the context of the zone debate. This idea is to a great extent in line with Finland's ambition to make a contribution, on a pan-Nordic foundation, to continued stability in the northern European region and as a result to avoid outside interference which could have an effect on the security situation in northern Europe.

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CSO: 5200/2585

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

NORDIC CONFERENCE SPLIT BY PARTY POLITICS

Representative Speeches Cited

PM050846 Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 1 Dec 85 p 9

[Dispatch by Larserik Haggman: "Confidence-Building Measures Also Affect the Soviet Union"]

[Text] Copenhagen--In his address to the Nordic nuclear-free zone conference in Copenhagen yesterday Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen expanded on his 1-year-old proposal for confidence-building measures for northern Europe that would go further than those decided by the Stockholm conference. According to Vayrynen such measures would apply to the Soviet Union as well as the Nordic countries.

Thus Vayrynen went further than his previous stance that northern Europe should enter into negotiations on further-reaching confidence-building measures after the Stockholm conference has reached agreement on a package of such measures.

However, Vayrynen did not put forward any specific outline of the type of measures of which he is thinking this time either, but there has been talk for example of lower ceiling for military maneuvers, lengthier advance warning, and so on.

Vayrynen considered his elucidation necessary because of the new Norwegian zone report which attaches importance to the conventional-nuclear arms combination and to the need for confidence-building measures in connection with a zone arrangement.

Vayrynen took the Norwegian report very seriously and promised careful Finnish study of it in the recently established working group in the Finnish Foreign Ministry. However, he also expressed the wish that the zone issue should not be linked to too many or too strict conditions.

The debate yesterday largely followed the same lines as emerged during the opening speeches on Friday [29 November]. Thus the divide went principally between the representatives of the conservative parties in the Nordic NATO nations and the rest.

Norwegian Conservative Party representative Jan P. Syse attacked the Social Democrats' position by quoting [Danish Social Democratic Party Chairman] Anker Jorgensen's statement made during his visit to Helsinki in 1981 when prime minister. At that time Jorgensen actually said that he could not be bothered to discuss a Nordic zone any more and that the whole discussion is unnecessary since a zone already exists.

"This makes it even more difficult to understand why the Danish Social Democrats should be the ones to go furthest in the direction of an isolated and unilaterally declared Nordic nuclear-free zone," Syse said, pointing out that the Danish party's foreign affairs spokesman, Lasse Budtz, is even said to want a zone based only on Soviet guarantees.

According to Syse no Nordic country is served by such shifts in security policy orientation which could create doubts, fears, or expectations about where one belongs.

"But it is precisely this that the last zone enthusiasts choose to ignore when they want to declare the Nordic area a nuclear-free zone," Syse said.

Danish Social Democrat Lasse Budtz said that during the course of the conference he has become increasingly convinced that a solid base exists for further work on the zone. He considered that those opposed to the zone were giving voice to habits of thought which experiences in security policy should have diminished.

"We should not wait for possible future results after Geneva. We have an independent responsibility, but if swift results do come from Geneva the zone plans could be speeded up further," Budtz declared.

He considered it self-evident that NATO should be informed, but also considered it equally obvious that NATO must respect a Nordic nuclear-free zone if the Nordic countries give their backing to a zone and remain firm on this issue.

According to Budtz it is typical of the debate that constant reminders are given of the Soviet arms arsenals close to the Nordic area but that Western nuclear arms on board warships in the immediate vicinity of the Nordic coasts are forgotten.

"The important thing is to create an arrangement which will preserve the Nordic area itself as a region of low tension and to ensure that crises cannot be escalated here," Budtz declared.

Like the Swedish parliamentarians the Finns were restrained about what they largely saw as a domestic political conflict in Norway and Denmark. Finnish Social Democratic Party Eduskunta group Chairman Pertti Paasio said openly that Finland does not want to force its views on anyone, but pointed out at the same time that the activity by the Nordic nations is necessary to defend

the results of Nordic cooperation in other areas. This is necessary because tension has increased in the immediate vicinity of the Nordic area.

National Coalition Party representative Ilkka Kanerva considered it important to view the zone against the background of the strategic situation which is subject to constant changes as a result of the repercussions of the differences between the superpowers. He also considers it important that the Nordic area should remove itself from the superpowers' spheres of strategic interest.

Swedish People's Party Eduskunta group Chairman Ole Norrback asked what role the Norwegian nuclear action [as published] has in today's NATO strategy with its nuclear-armed submarines and aircraft. He assumed that Norway's hesitancy is more political than military and wondered what effect the conference could now have on the superpower talks.

Constitutional Party of the Right Chairman George C. Ehrnrooth broke Finnish unity and expressed doubts about the zone idea given the developments in arm technology and the growing superpower interest in the northern regions.

Center Party Eduskunta group leader Juhani Tuomaala said that the constructive dialogue at the conference could have a noticeable effect in promoting the measures being prepared by the governments. Finnish People's Democratic League group Chairman Veikko Saarto also expressed satisfaction with the conference as such and hoped that the process would continue.

Icelandic Social Democratic Party leader Jon Hannibalsson differed from all the other speakers when in a tough speech he described the zone as politically naive, military dangerous, and morally dubious. He also wondered what the tyrants in the Kremlin have in mind.

Hannibalsson's remarks caused Finnish Social Democratic Party Secretary Erkki Liikanen to ask to be allowed to reply, and he questioned the usefulness of putting forward fifties' arguments in a discussion of and in the eighties.

Palme, Benkow Lead Conflict

PM050842 Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 30 Nov 85 p 8

[Dispatch by Ake Ekdahl: "Head-On Collision at Zone Meeting Opening"]

[Excerpt] Copenhagen--The disagreements between the Nordic Social Democrats and the Nordic Conservative Parties on the possibility of creating a nuclear-free zone in the Nordic area were revealed with unexpected clarity at the first major conference of parliamentarians on the zone issue.

Some 150 elected representatives from all 5 Nordic parliaments and from some 30 political parties met yesterday in the Landsting chamber in Christiansborg to assess popular demand for a zone arrangement.

The meeting began with a head-on collision between the two opening speakers, Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme and Jo Benkow of the Norwegian Conservative Party.

The subsequent between the two--a proper quarrel.

Palme declared that he is an optimist and believes in continued progress on the zone talks. He sees a clear difference between the possibility of creating a zone today and the possibility of doing so a few years ago.

The background to these hopes is that the peoples of the Nordic area have declared that they want a nuclear-free zone, that the problems are no longer being denied, that the international climate is better, and the fact that there were positive signals from the Geneva summit.

Palme attached great importance to the fact that the two top leaders from the superpowers jointly stated that nuclear arms are militarily unusable.

The Swedish prime minister also declared that he wants to work to promote the Finnish proposal for a joint Nordic investigation into a nuclear-free zone. A decision in this direction could come at the Nordic prime ministers' meeting in Helsinki in December.

Palme was also optimistic about Soviet concessions on nuclear arms in the Baltic, nuclear arms targeted on the territory of the Nordic countries and nuclear arms deployed in the immediate vicinity of the Nordic area.

"NATO has made concessions on nuclear arms in the Nordic area; I assume that the Soviet Union is prepared to make corresponding concessions. But this presupposes that the superpowers see the zone as advantageous to their interests."

Palme said that he found the zone debate uninteresting up to the day when the Soviet Union declared that it was prepared for discussions on the nuclear arms in the vicinity of the Nordic area. Then the discussion became more realistic, Palme said.

"In my heart of hearts I do not believe that Benkow is like an unchanging pillar of salt in the desert, but that he too views these developments with a certain optimism."

Benkow also said that he is an optimist and also fundamentally an advocate of a nuclear-free zone, but he also considers himself to be more of a realist than Palme.

"Fine words and political incantations do not solve any problems," he said.

He found it difficult to have as much confidence in the Russians as Palme and said that a different geographical deployment of the nuclear arms would not

increase Nordic security from one moment to the next. Nor could Benkow see any signs of any Soviet willingness to make concessions.

"The most serious mistake would be if the Nordic area were to begin negotiations with one of the superpowers."

However, Palme and Benkow were able to agree that negotiations with the Soviet Union would first require agreement within the Nordic area so that it would be possible for the Nordic countries to act jointly.

But even the road to a joint Nordic stance seems long and difficult--that was shown by the first day's debate in Copenhagen.

Even though this was the parliamentarians' own conference the government's guest speakers and observers stole the show on the first day.

Palme's speech was characterized by great caution. He said that the continued work against nuclear arms could take place through applying pressure on the nuclear powers, to get them to remember their particular responsibility for peace and security, but also through discussions of how we can prevent increased tension in the Nordic area.

"We are not striving to give any side an advantage, but to ensure our security."

Palme, like the majority of other participants, stressed the importance of keeping the zone debate alive, despite divisions in the various Nordic countries.

We must take as our point of departure the respect for each Nordic country's right to decide itself which policy best serves its national interests. Let us capitalize on our common desire to preserve the calm of the Nordic area. Let us prevent the growth of new areas of confrontation between the superpower blocs. All the Nordic countries have derived benefit from the security policy pattern which has prevailed in the Nordic area in the postwar period, Palme said.

Social Democrats Seek Initiative

PM041615 Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 1 Dec 85 p 6

[Dispatch by Lars Christiansson: "Social Democrats Propose Nordic Nuclear-Free Zone Working Group"]

[Text] Copenhagen--The Nordic Social Democratic Parties are now making a new attempt to win back the initiative in the debate on the Nordic nuclear-free zone.

This became clear yesterday at the parliamentarians' conference on the Nordic nuclear-free zone in Copenhagen.

Under what were called "coup-like circumstances" by representatives of the Nordic Conservative Parties, Danish Social Democratic Party Chairman Anker Jorgensen presented a joint statement from the Nordic Social Democratic Parties to the effect that these will take the initiative for the establishment of a pan-Nordic working group consisting of deputies from the Nordic parliaments. They will look further into the "problems and possibilities" surrounding the establishment of a Nordic nuclear-free zone.

The Social Democratic Parties are also calling for support for the idea put forward by Finland for the establishment of a group of Nordic civil servants who will also investigate and develop the zone idea.

The Social Democratic statement was made public during a joint press conference with the other Nordic parties. The Conservative Parties had no knowledge of what was going to be presented at the press conference.

The Social Democratic statement created a stir because the common point of departure for the parliamentarians' conference was that no decisions would be reached and no statements adopted.

It was also clear that the Social Democratic Parties considered Friday's [29 November] conference debate too much dominated by the Nordic Conservative Parties, which are skeptical about the possibility and point of establishing a nuclear-free zone in the Nordic area. There was already talk on Friday evening that the conservative offensive had to be countered.

The Nordic cooperation committee behind the conference was chaired jointly by Danish Social Democratic Chairman Anker Jorgensen and the Norwegian Conservative Party's Jo Benkow. These two also chaired the press conference at which the Social Democratic gambit was played.

Jo Benkow said that he had not been informed of the Social Democratic Parties' action.

He also said moves of this type could have the effect of complicating future discussion on the zone. Benkow hinted that the Social Democrats had put forward this statement primarily for domestic political reasons in their respective countries.

The Swedish Moderate Coalition Party's Carl Bildt was also noticeably irritated by the Social Democrats' behavior. He described it as "domestic political posturing, designed to create problems for further work on the zone issue. It is also a breach of the prior conditions drawn up for this conference."

The toughest comments on the Social Democrats' behavior came, however, from Danish Liberal Party Folketing group Chairman Iva Hansen:

"The statement from the Social Democratic Parties in the Nordic area shows that Anker Jorgensen and Gro Harlem Brundtland choose for Denmark and Norway to ignore the two countries' NATO commitments.

"It is possible that the two take the view that if you are not in government then you do not have to demonstrate any responsibility," he said, stressing that both the proposal for a pan-Nordic parliamentarians' report on a zone and the proposal for a civil servants' report are irreconcilable with NATO membership because they have not first been discussed with the NATO alliance partners.

The Social Democratic statement said that the various parties will also take the initiative to follow up the proposals in their respective parliaments and that they would also like to see a new pan-Nordic parliamentarians' conference, like the one arranged in Copenhagen.

Here at the conference a stir was created because the Social Democrats implemented their decision to publish a statement without first discussing it with the Nordic Conservative Parties. However, they did privately inform the Nordic Center Parties.

Swedish Riksdag Deputy Gunnar Bjork (Center Party) said that he shares the view that the Social Democrats staged a coup. The action gives the impression that the conference reached agreement on some sort of declaration. At the same time he also said that the Nordic Center Parties support the idea of a pan-Nordic parliamentary investigation.

After the Social Democratic demarche was made public around midday, the parliamentarians' debate came to concentrate mostly on this.

It was clear from the debate, which at times almost became an open quarrel, how differently the Social Democratic Parties and the Conservative Parties view the possibility of implementing a nuclear-free zone in the Nordic area.

The Social Democratic Parties attach great importance to declamatory statements of what major importance the nuclear-free zone has for the security of the Nordic area. They talk about and actively advocate pan-Nordic working groups and government initiatives which, as they put it, are intended to carry the zone question further.

The Conservative Parties on the other hand put the main emphasis in their contributions to the debate on the problems attached to the zone initiative. Norway's so-called Colding report, which is very pessimistic about the possibility of establishing a nuclear-free zone, played a major role in the Conservatives' and the Moderate Coalition Party's contributions to the debate.

The Conservatives and Moderates also attached great importance to the consideration that a zone can only be achieved as part of a broader European arrangement and after an agreement between East and West on balanced reductions in the nuclear arsenals, to bring them down to a low level, and on a balance in the field of conventional arms.

Paper Denounces Conservative Criticism

PM051952 Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 3 Dec 85 p 4

[Editorial: "Nuclear Debate"]

[Text] In all democracies today an open debate is taking place on nuclear arms. More and more people are asking whether there is not something fundamentally wrong with a "defense policy" which in the final analysis could destroy everything it was really intended to defend. In Geneva President Reagan and party chief Gorbachev agreed that a nuclear war cannot be won and therefore should not be fought.

In Copenhagen Nordic Social Democrats have proposed the setting up of a multiparty group of Nordic parliamentarians to work further on the question of establishing a nuclear-free zone in the Nordic area.

Conservative politicians with the conservative press behind them are highly exasperated. "A gross insult," AFTENPOSTEN writes, pointing out, that the Norwegian government has given its support in principle to the zone idea.

But is it so wrong to try to keep the idea alive and the process going? Or must one wait this time too for the go-ahead from the NATO alliance's most conservative elements? Some people are so afraid of the debate that mentally they would have fitted in the other great defense alliance much better.

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NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

DANES TAKE CRITICAL VIEW OF ZONE PROPOSAL

Paper Considers Progress Doubtful

PM041321 Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 29 Nov 85 p 12

[Editorial: "The Copenhagen Conference"]

[Text] When Nordic parliamentarians meet today in Copenhagen to discuss the Nordic area as a nuclear-free zone, it is not a new discussion that is starting. For more than 20 years it has been a topic in the Nordic debate. It was Finland which originally--and in various different versions--started the debate, and for many years Finland stood alone with its views. But with the changes in security policy thinking that have characterized both Norway and Denmark, scope for the idea has also grown outside Finland. Since the beginning of the eighties the Danish Folketing has discussed the idea on several occasions and in the 3 May 1984 Folketing resolution, for example, the zone issue occupies a central place.

The conference's host is [Social Democratic Party Chairman] Anker Jorgensen. From Sweden and Finland will come the heads of government, although Norwegian Prime Minister Kare Willoch has not wanted to take part. Here it must be added that parliamentarians from other Danish political parties have more or less wholeheartedly backed the ideas behind the conference. It would seem therefore that some movement has entered the deliberations that have been going on for so long. And it seems from a recently conducted opinion poll, commissioned by a number of peace groups, that the population of Denmark is behind both the conference and the objectives of the conference initiative.

Despite the multitude of positive signals it is more than doubtful whether anything useful will emerge from the conference. First and foremost, the interests of the Nordic countries are characterized more by diversity than by uniformity in the field of security policy. Finland's special relationship with its large neighbor to the east and Sweden's neutralist line constitute a decisive difference from the other countries, all of which are members of NATO. Even though many zone supporters claim that a nuclear-free zone is reconcilable with NATO membership, no one has as yet been able to explain how NATO's present and potential strategy can be reconciled with and cover member nations which in all situations will refrain from seeking protection under the nuclear umbrella.

In addition the conference is taking place--luckily or unluckily--at a time when for the first time in years it is possible to see some movement in superpower relations. If the spirit of Geneva leads to a real process and if the dialogue between the superpowers has a concrete effect at the disarmament negotiations in Geneva, the Nordic ideas will collapse like a house of cards. Not because it can be ruled out in advance that the establishment of nuclear-free zones could be a topic for negotiations between East and West, but because things would then be happening in the wrong order: first, overall guidelines must come, then regional arrangements. No one today is able to assess whether progress can be made with such arms control measures. But everyone should be able to see that, given the present developments in the international climate, it is of crucial importance that all NATO members close ranks within the alliance to give it the strength necessary for the forthcoming negotiations at the highest level.

Politicians Ignore Real Dangers

PM101957 Copenhagen AKTUELT in Danish 2 Dec 85 pp 10-11

[Social Democratic Folketing Deputy Robert Pedersen "chronicle" article: "A Nuclear-Free Nordic Area: The Emperor's New Clothes"]

[Text] It is a long time since there were emperors.

But for the sake of the annals of history it is a good thing that we still have statesmen who put all their money on ideological window-dressing. There are after all difficulties with unemployment figures, trade deficits and environmental problems, so it is a good thing that it is possible to put a lightweight but appealing idea before the whole people.

Unfortunately--unlike in Hans Christian Andersen's day--we no longer have swindlers for the police deal with them, but by way of compensation we do have a large number of international dreamers in the Nordic area who are not weighed down by a sense of reality, but who are misled by wishful thinking.

And they have succeeded in involving almost all political leaders in the promotion of the illusion of a nuclear-free Nordic area.

"Magnifique," say the party secretaries, and send round invitations from Kirkenes to Gedser.

"Magnifique," reply the academics, and begin seriously to draw up proposed treaties and draft conventions.

May I be allowed to ask the infantile question whether the idea really has anything to cover its nakedness, even though in doing so I leave myself open to the fairy tale's condemning remark:

"God, listen to the voice of the innocent," for it is possible that one person will whisper to the next what the innocent said.

"Are there any nuclear arms at all in any of the Nordic countries?"

No.

"Are there political groupings in Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, or Sweden which want nuclear arms?"

No.

"Is there any likelihood that outside powers want nuclear arms deployed in the Nordic area for some reason or other?"

No.

This could very well be the end of the story, but I will extend the story with a few questions on which we ourselves do not have exclusive influence.

If we look at the map of our five countries, are there within this geographically defined area any nuclear arms?

Here the answer must be "yes."

A few months ago there was a discussion about the presence of nuclear arms on board the U.S. warship "Utah."

I do not know whether the answer here was in the affirmative, but I would be inclined to think so. I base this view on the fact, for example, that Denmark, Iceland, and Norway as members of NATO have approved the strategy of deterrence called the balance of terror, which means that both superpowers' nuclear arms are spread so widely that a surprise attack is made unlikely.

Further, I know that there are Soviet submarines carrying nuclear arms in our waters.

"So the idea for a Nordic nuclear-free zone is to be realized by inviting the superpowers to a conference at which we will subject them to such irresistible pressure that they will protect little Scandinavia like an oasis in an otherwise warlike world?"

No, that is not the idea, as far as I know.

On the contrary, the Norwegian government has attached to negotiations for a nuclear-free zone the condition that the Soviet Union reduces its nuclear arsenal on the Kola peninsula. General Secretary Brezhnev's reply was to the effect that this was external interference in the Soviet Union's internal affairs.

In front of me I have a document from the U.S. Embassy in Copenhagen which backs the principle of nuclear-free zones but which contains so many objections to a Nordic zone that we should not expect the go-ahead for the

Nordic statesmen's idea from the other superpowers either. This idea also got put on ice when the so-called Whisky submarine ran aground off Karlskrona and one of those who took the initiative for the recent Copenhagen conference [Social Democratic Party Chairman Anker Jorgensen] rejected journalists' questions about a zone at that time with the words, "Just stop all that nonsense now."

When Nordic politicians come face to face with reality they abandon their wishful thinking.

If we demonstrate the geographical magnanimity of bringing the Faeroes, Iceland, and Greenland into the zone, there is a recent document produced by former Defense Staff Chief G. K. Kristensen who has his own feud with the rest of the armed forces. When the good colonel, under the title "The Road to a Treaty Can Be Built Now--If the Political Will Exists," strikes a blow for the Nordic zone, readers will perhaps ask the innocent question, "If it is the case that a buildup of nuclear arms is taking place in Iceland, in the Norwegian Sea, and in the North Atlantic, as G. K. Kristensen is surely correct in pointing out, who then can make the above-mentioned areas free from nuclear arms?"

However, there is one group in the debate which can by no means be accused of wishful thinking, and its foremost spokesman is [Danish Socialist People's Party Chairman] Gert Petersen. He knows very well that if the Folketing not only declares Denmark nuclear-free in peacetime and in times of crisis, but also wartime, this amounts in reality to Danish withdrawal from NATO, and Gert Petersen has every right to fight for this. A possible alternative would be that we doubled the conscripts' length of service in the armed forces and trebled our defense spending, for then we would not need any agreements on reinforcements, but does anyone want that?

Gert Petersen at least does not!

For Denmark's sake we must hope that just as things slowly dawned on the emperor in the story when the imperial procession was coming to an end, it will also dawn on Nordic statesmen so that they will start worrying about facts and not about fairy stories.

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NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

SWEDISH PAPERS WEIGH DEVELOPMENT OF ZONE CONCEPT

Status Quo Considered Sensible

PM051938 Stockholm SVENSK DAGBLADET in Swedish 3 Dec 85 p 2

[Fredrik Braconier "Insight" article: "A Small Victory for the Nordic Area"]

[Text] Who wants a treaty-enshrined nuclear-free zone in the Nordic area?

Who wants the discussion on such a zone to continue?

And who wants the current nuclear-free status of the Nordic area to be preserved?

These are questions which can and should be put in the eternal zone debate, which recently erupted into activity with the parliamentarians' conference in Copenhagen. But it is by no means certain that these questions have identical answers.

An unambiguous answer can be given to the first question. The Soviet Union wants a treaty-enshrined nuclear-free zone in the Nordic area in which the state there would say "no" to nuclear arms forever. It was the Soviet Union which initiated the zone idea at the end of the fifties and the Soviet motives were clear.

In a widely reported speech in Riga in June 1959 the then Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, said:

"I hope that it will be correctly understood in Denmark and Norway when I say that these two countries have ended up in the Atlantic Pact through a misunderstanding. To put things bluntly: What can they have in common with this organization, in which the West German militarists are setting the tone to an increasing extent."

In Khrushchev's footsteps Soviet government organ IZVESTIYA asserted:

"The establishment of such a zone in northern Europe would also be the first step in all the Nordic countries' transition to a neutral stance. A real

possibility of such a transition exists. Sweden's example attests persuasively to this."

These quotations show with all the necessary clarity that the Soviet Union launched the zone plan from the start with the ulterior motive of getting Denmark and Norway out of NATO.

It is obvious that such an operation is in the Soviet Union's interests. But have the Nordic countries anything to gain from radically changing the pattern of security policy in the region and being left entirely on their own with the superpower to the east?

The answer must be a firm "no." If you look at a world map, Finland, Sweden, and Norway at least appear like a small outgrowth of the Soviet land mass. The Nordic countries need an additional weight in the scales if the balance is not to be completely awry.

Denmark and Norway have, as we all know, placed powerful restrictions on their NATO involvement. They do not allow foreign troops or nuclear arms on their territory under normal circumstances. But if the situation were to become acute these restrictions would be reconsidered.

Possible Soviet adventures against Nordic countries--and this does not only include Denmark and Norway--could therefore carry a very high price. This is hardly a disadvantage either for Sweden or for Finland.

But who can then profit from the fact that the zone discussion rolls on decade after decade?

During the sixties and the seventies it was Finland and President Kekkonen who kept the idea alive. Even though it is possible to doubt whether Finland at heart wants a treaty-enshrined nuclear-free zone--for example, restraining statements could be noted from Finland when other Nordic states began to rush headlong in the eighties--it is not excessively difficult to find rational motives behind Finland's actions.

With its arguments for a zone, Finland is showing that it is favorably disposed toward a pet Soviet idea, and this may create good will in Moscow. In addition Finland has every interest in the world in working against nuclear arms deployment in the Nordic area on the NATO side. Such deployment could give the Soviet Union the excuse to invoke the Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance Treaty and destroy the country's endeavors to seem to be one neutral nation in the circle of neutral nations.

The intense zone process we have been able to observe during the eighties has other driving forces. It started within the Norwegian Labor Party with Jens Evensen's--whose close confidant was Arne Trebølt--controversial speech in the fall of 1980 and has since spread above all to the Social Democratic sister parts in Sweden and Denmark.

It is probably not too far-fetched to see traces of tactical party motives, for example, behind the zone boom in the last few years. In the context of the row about NATO's Euromissiles the peace question has become an important issue and is a powerful force within the Social Democratic Parties in the NATO nations in particular. Involvement in the work for a nuclear-free zone has become a method for leaderships to keep their movements together and to prevent NATO membership as such from becoming the main issue in the debate.

Who, finally, is served by ensuring that the existing nuclear-free status of the Nordic area has a long and stable life?

Finland, we have already answered, but this answer is hardly exhaustive. In actual fact everyone in the Nordic area has an interest in preserving the status quo. Just as an isolated nuclear-free zone in the Nordic area would upset the stability of northern Europe, the introduction of nuclear arms into the area would probably have revolutionary consequences. Such an introduction would in itself actually be proof that the situation had radically worsened.

Fighting for the status quo and the present state of affairs is perhaps not that glamorous. But it is probably the most sensible security objective which the Nordic countries collectively can have.

Fortunately the meeting in Copenhagen does not mean a boost for the zone idea either. On the contrary, it was the opponents of the zone who seized the initiative with their concrete arguments, while its supporters digressed into more general proclamations. Even though not everyone agrees--at least not publicly--realism and what is best for the Nordic area's security won a small victory in Copenhagen as a result.

Progress Evaluated Historically

PM052004 Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 2 Dec 85 p 2

[Editorial: "The Nuclear-Free Zone Again"]

[Text] Giving the whole of the Nordic area the status of a protected area is scarcely the objective any longer. Nowadays the fine phrases are no longer trotted out when a nuclear-free zone is discussed. A spirit of "realism" and "hurry slowly" seems to characterize the people who are working for this goal with the greatest tenacity.

The weekend's meeting of parliamentarians in Copenhagen did at least give the problem a certain intensity. The zone is discussed with least reservations in the Nordic political and trade union context. Last year popular movements held a conference on the problem. And also among those who met this time--representatives of all parties--there is probably a majority in favor of tackling jointly and more energetically the concrete task of analysis and other necessary preparations. But this did not prevent the Social Democratic attempt to speed up activities from arousing opposition in Copenhagen.

The snag is that an attempt to force the issue could lead to government crises in both Denmark and Norway. This is of course one reason why in the last couple of years the debate has seemed somewhat muted. Heating up the zone brew after a time on the back burner requires a careful touch--even though the dish will still take a long time to cook.

In his address, which was couched in general terms, Olof Palme presented a picture of the problems which ought to be well-known to anyone who has followed the zone discussion to any extent. At government level Sweden has from time to time played the role of a more or less cautious prompter. Some peculiarities in the Swedish approach were removed as time passed.

The guideline for the government's work has been the speech which Olof Palme delivered to the Paasikivi Society in Helsinki in the summer of 1983. The best summary of main Swedish views on the zone issue is contained in a Foreign Ministry document from November last year.

In actual fact through investigations and reports in all the Nordic countries the problem can be said to have been well and truly aired. So much groundwork has been done that the key questions must be considered to have been identified. The zone question has after all a long history from the occasion in the fifties when the Soviet Union brought up the question of Nordic nuclear-free status.

In 1963 Finnish President Kekkonen launched his first initiative. He further developed his ideas in a widely reported speech to the Foreign Affairs Institute in Stockholm in 1978. For Finland a zone arrangement would at best further strengthen its independence and its neutralist endeavors. In Norway it was Ambassador Jens Evensen who gave stimulus to the zone debate.

For Sweden Anders Thunborg, when an under secretary of state in 1975, outlined an important framework when he pointed out--also in a speech in Finland--that a zone arrangement should involve the removal of nuclear arms from "land areas east and south of the zone and the sea areas west and north of it." In the early summer of 1981 a unanimous Riksdag Foreign Affairs Committee entrusted the government with the task of investigating the zone question together with the other Nordic governments.

The best collection of objections to a zone has existed for a little while in the Norwegian Colding report. This says for example that a broad European solution must precede the establishment of a Nordic nuclear-free zone, while Olof Palme's views, for example, is that progress on the zone issue could "in itself" make construction contributions to detente.

The Norwegians' observation that the nuclear threat would remain even against a nuclear-free zone would seem less controversial. The Foreign Ministry's document does after all say that we should not have "unrealistic expectations." The superpower weapons that could be removed in an "attenuation zone" [uttunningszon] consist in the Swedish view simply of nuclear arms which are

intended for or suitable for targets within the Nordic zone, something which clearly does not satisfy the critics.

However, it is interesting that the Norwegian report is not opposed to the discussion and analysis of the zone issue by a joint group of Nordic civil servants. Here at least we have come some way from Prime Minister Kåre Willoch's talk of "pure indulgence in illusions."

Danish Social Democratic Party Chairman Anker Jørgensen's comparison of the zone with a "cheese-dish cover" which, together with other steps, will amount to confidence-building measures strikes in everyday note which could point the way for future Nordic analysis work.

However, the Nordic community must reserve itself the right to take the initiative for a zone agreement. Norway and Denmark need to consult their NATO allies. A nuclear-free zone also presupposed that the superpowers will give guarantees that they will not attack the area with nuclear arms. The value of and problems attaching to such "negative guarantees" must be carefully weighed.

However, first we must see whether we even get that far.

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